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Abstract
This paper studies the complexity classesQZK andHVQZK, the classes of problems having a quantum com-
putational zero-knowledge proof system and an honest-verifier quantum computational zero-knowledge proof
system, respectively. The results proved in this paper include:
• HVQZK = QZK.
• Any problem in QZK has a public-coin quantum computational zero-knowledge proof system.
• Any problem inQZK has a quantum computational zero-knowledge proof system of perfect completeness.
• Any problem in QZK has a three-message public-coin quantum computational zero-knowledge proof
system of perfect completeness with polynomially small error in soundness (hence with arbitrarily small
constant error in soundness).
All the results proved in this paper are unconditional, i.e., they do not rely any computational assumptions such
as the existence of quantum one-way functions or permutations. For the classes QPZK, HVQPZK, and QSZK
of problems having a quantum perfect zero-knowledge proof system, an honest-verifier quantum perfect zero-
knowledge proof system, and a quantum statistical zero-knowledge proof system, respectively, the following
new properties are proved:
• HVQPZK = QPZK.
• Any problem in QPZK has a public-coin quantum perfect zero-knowledge proof system.
• Any problem in QSZK has a quantum statistical zero-knowledge proof system of perfect completeness.
• Any problem in QSZK has a three-message public-coin quantum statistical zero-knowledge proof system
of perfect completeness with polynomially small error in soundness (hence with arbitrarily small constant
error in soundness).
It is stressed that the proofs for all the statements are direct and do not use complete promise problems or those
equivalents. This gives a unified framework that works well for all of quantum perfect, statistical, and compu-
tational zero-knowledge proofs. In particular, this enables us to prove properties even on the computational and
perfect zero-knowledge proofs for which no complete promise problems nor those equivalents are known.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Zero-knowledge proof systems were introduced by Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff [15], and have played a central
role in modern cryptography since then. Intuitively, an interactive proof system is zero-knowledge if any verifier
who communicates with the honest prover learns nothing except for the validity of the statement being proved in
that system. By “learns nothing” we mean that there exists a polynomial-time simulator whose output is indistin-
guishable from the output of the verifier after communicating with the honest prover. Depending on the strength of
this indistinguishability, several variants of zero-knowledge proofs have been investigated: perfect zero-knowledge
in which the output of the simulator is identical to that of the verifier, statistical zero-knowledge in which the
output of the simulator is statistically close to that of the verifier, and computational zero-knowledge in which the
output of the simulator is indistinguishable from that of the verifier in polynomial time. The most striking result
on zero-knowledge proofs would be that every problem in NP has a computational zero-knowledge proof system
under certain intractability assumptions [11] like the existence of one-way functions [24, 17]. It is also known
that some problems have perfect or statistical zero-knowledge proof systems. Among others, the GRAPH ISO-
MORPHISM problem has a perfect zero-knowledge proof system [11], and some lattice problems have statistical
zero-knowledge proof systems [10].
Another direction of studies on zero-knowledge proofs has been to prove general properties of zero-knowledge
proofs. Sahai and Vadhan [28] were the first that took an approach of characterizing zero-knowledge proofs by
complete promise problems. They showed that the STATISTICAL DIFFERENCE problem is complete for the class
HVSZK of problems having an honest-verifier statistical zero-knowledge proof system. Here, the honest-verifier
zero-knowledge is a weaker notion of zero-knowledge in which now zero-knowledge property holds only against
the honest verifier who follows the specified protocol. Using this complete promise problem, they proved a num-
ber of general properties of HVSZK and simplified the proofs of several previously known results including that
HVSZK is in AM [7, 2], that HVSZK is closed under complement [26], and that any problem in HVSZK has
a public-coin honest-verifier statistical zero-knowledge proof system [26]. Goldreich and Vadhan [14] presented
another complete promise problem for HVSZK, called the ENTROPY DIFFERENCE problem, and obtained further
properties of HVSZK. Since Goldreich, Sahai, and Vadhan [12] proved that HVSZK = SZK, where SZK denotes
the class of problems having a statistical zero-knowledge proof system, all the properties for HVSZK are inherited
to SZK (except for those related to round complexity). Along this line, Goldreich, Sahai, and Vadhan [13] gave two
complete promise problems for the class NISZK of problems having a non-interactive statistical zero-knowledge
proof system, and derived several properties of NISZK. More recently, Vadhan [31] gave two characterizations,
the INDISTINGUISHABILITY characterization and the CONDITIONAL PSEUDO-ENTROPY characterization, for the
class ZK of problems having a computational zero-knowledge proof system. These are not complete promise
problems, but more or less analogous to complete promise problems and play essentially same roles as complete
promise problems in his proof. Using these characterizations, Vadhan proved a number of general properties for ZK
unconditionally (i.e., not assuming any intractability assumptions), such as that honest-verifier computational zero-
knowledge equals general computational zero-knowledge, that public-coin computational zero-knowledge equals
general computational zero-knowledge, and that computational zero-knowledge of perfect completeness equals
general two-sided bounded error computational zero-knowledge.
Quantum zero-knowledge proofs were first studied by Watrous [32] in a restricted situation of honest-verifier
quantum statistical zero-knowledge proofs. He gave an analogous characterization to the classical case by Sa-
hai and Vadhan [28] by showing that the QUANTUM STATE DISTINGUISHABILITY problem is complete for the
class HVQSZK of problems having an honest-verifier quantum statistical zero-knowledge proof system. Using
this, he proved a number of general properties for HVQSZK, such as that HVQSZK is closed under complement,
that any problem in HVQSZK has a public-coin honest-verifier quantum statistical zero-knowledge proof system,
and that HVQSZK is in PSPACE. Very recently, Ben-Aroya and Ta-Shma [3] presented another complete promise
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problem for HVQSZK, called the QUANTUM ENTROPY DIFFERENCE problem, which is a quantum analogue of
the result by Goldreich and Vadhan [14]. Kobayashi [21] studied non-interactive quantum perfect and statistical
zero-knowledge proofs again using a complete promise problem, which can be viewed as a quantum version of
the classical result by Goldreich, Sahai, and Vadhan [13]. It has been a wide open problem if there are nontrivial
problems that has a quantum zero-knowledge proof system secure even against any dishonest quantum verifiers,
because of the difficulties arising from the “rewinding” technique [16], which is commonly-used in classical zero-
knowledge proofs. Damga˚rd, Fehr, and Salvail [5] studied zero-knowledge proofs against dishonest quantum veri-
fier, but they assumed the restricted setting of the common-reference-string model to avoid this rewinding problem.
Very recently, Watrous [34] settled this affirmatively. He developed a quantum “rewinding” technique by using a
method that was originally developed in Ref. [23] for the purpose of amplifying the success probability of QMA,
a quantum version of NP, without increasing quantum witness sizes. With this quantum rewinding technique, he
proved that the classical protocol for the GRAPH ISOMORPHISM problem in Ref. [11] has a perfect zero-knowledge
property even against any dishonest quantum verifiers, and under some reasonable intractability assumption, the
classical protocol for NP in Ref. [11] has a computational zero-knowledge property even against any dishonest
quantum verifiers. He also proved that HVQSZK = QSZK, where QSZK denotes the class of problems having
a quantum statistical zero-knowledge proof system. This implies that all the properties for HVQSZK proved in
Ref. [32] are inherited to QSZK (except for those related to round complexity), in particular, that any problem in
QSZK has a public-coin quantum statistical zero-knowledge proof system.
1.2 Our Contribution
This paper proves a number of general properties on quantum zero-knowledge proofs, not restricted to quantum
statistical zero-knowledge proofs. Specifically, for quantum computational zero-knowledge proofs, letting QZK
and HVQZK denote the classes of problems having a quantum computational zero-knowledge proof system and
an honest-verifier quantum computational zero-knowledge proof system, respectively, the following are proved
among others:
Theorem (Theorem 29). HVQZK = QZK.
Theorem (Theorem 30). Any problem in QZK has a public-coin quantum computational zero-knowledge proof
system.
Theorem (Theorem 32). Any problem in QZK has a quantum computational zero-knowledge proof system of
perfect completeness.
Theorem (Theorem 34). Any problem in QZK has a three-message public-coin quantum computational zero-
knowledge proof system of perfect completeness with soundness error probability at most 1p for any polynomially
bounded function p : Z+ → N (hence with arbitrarily small constant error in soundness).
All the properties proved in this paper on quantum computational zero-knowledge proofs hold unconditionally,
meaning that they hold without any computational assumptions such as the existence of quantum one-way functions
or permutations. Some of these properties may be regarded as quantum versions of the results by Vadhan [31]. It is
stressed, however, that our approach to prove these properties is completely different from those the existing studies
took to prove general properties of classical or quantum zero-knowledge proofs. No complete promise problems
nor those equivalents are used in our proofs. Instead, we directly prove these properties, which gives a unified
framework that works well for all of quantum perfect, statistical, and computational zero-knowledge proofs.
The idea is remarkably simple. We start from any protocol of honest-verifier quantum zero-knowledge, and ap-
ply several modifications so that we finally obtain another protocol of honest-verifier quantum zero-knowledge that
possesses a number of desirable properties. For instance, to prove that HVQZK = QZK, we show that any protocol
of honest-verifier quantum computational zero-knowledge can be modified to another protocol of honest-verifier
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quantum computational zero-knowledge (with some smaller gap between completeness and soundness accepting
probabilities) such that (i) the protocol consists of three messages and (ii) the protocol is public-coin in which the
message from the honest verifier consists of a single bit that is an outcome of a classical fair coin-flipping. Note
that such modifications are possible in the case of usual quantum interactive proofs [20, 23], and we show that this
is also the case for honest-verifier quantum computational zero-knowledge proofs. Now we apply the quantum
rewinding technique due to Watrous [34] to show that the protocol is zero-knowledge even against any dishonest
quantum verifiers. The final tip is the sequential repetition, which reduces completeness and soundness errors ar-
bitrarily small. This simultaneously shows the equivalence of public-coin quantum computational zero-knowledge
and general quantum computational zero-knowledge. To show that any quantum computational zero-knowledge
proofs can be made perfect complete, now we have only to show that any honest-verifier quantum computational
zero-knowledge proofs can be made perfect complete. Again a similar property is known to hold for usual quan-
tum interactive proofs [20], and we carefully modify the protocol so that it holds even for the honest-verifier
quantum computational zero-knowledge case. Using this modification as a preprocessing, the previous argument
shows the equivalence of quantum computational zero-knowledge of perfect completeness and general quantum
computational zero-knowledge. Combining all the desirable properties of honest-verifier quantum computational
zero-knowledge proofs shown in this paper with a careful application of the quantum rewinding technique, we can
show that any problem in QZK has a three-message public-coin quantum computational zero-knowledge proof
system of perfect completeness with soundness error at most 1p for any polynomially bounded function p.
In fact, our approach above is very general and basically works well even for quantum perfect and statistical
zero-knowledge proofs. In the quantum statistical zero-knowledge case, all the properties shown for the quantum
computational zero-knowledge case also hold. This gives alternative proofs of some of the properties obtained in
Refs. [32, 34], and also shows the following new properties of quantum statistical zero-knowledge proofs:
Theorem (Theorem 37). Any problem in QSZK has a quantum statistical zero-knowledge proof system of perfect
completeness.
Theorem (Theorem 38). Any problem in QSZK has a three-message public-coin quantum statistical zero-
knowledge proof system of perfect completeness with soundness error probability at most 1p for any polynomially
bounded function p : Z+ → N (hence with arbitrarily small constant error in soundness).
In the quantum perfect zero-knowledge case, however, not all the properties above can be shown to hold,
because very subtle points easily lose the perfect zero-knowledge property. In particular, our method of making
protocols perfect complete that works well for quantum computational and statistical zero-knowledge cases no
longer works well for quantum perfect zero-knowledge case. Also, we need a very careful modification of the
protocol when parallelizing to three messages. Still, we can show the following properties:
Theorem (Theorem 22). HVQPZK = QPZK.
Theorem (Theorem 23). Any problem in QPZK has a public-coin quantum perfect zero-knowledge proof system.
Note that no such general properties are known for the classical perfect zero-knowledge case. As a bonus property,
it is also proved that the quantum perfect zero-knowledge with a worst-case polynomial-time simulator that is not
allowed to output “FAIL” is equivalent to the one in which a simulator is allowed to output “FAIL” with small
probability. Again, such equivalence is not known in the classical case.
1.3 Organization of This Paper
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the notions and notations that are used in this paper.
Sections 3, 4, and 5 treat our results for quantum perfect, computational, and statistical zero-knowledge proofs,
respectively. In order to present a unified framework that works well for all of quantum perfect, computational,
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and statistical zero-knowledge proofs, we first show the results for the perfect zero-knowledge case. This may
involve more careful modifications of the protocols that are necessary only for the perfect zero-knowledge case,
but once we have presented how to modify the protocols, we can avoid complications arising from imperfect zero-
knowledge conditions when proving zero-knowledge property, which will be helpful to illustrate most of our proof
structures in a simpler setting. Section 6 proves the equivalence of two different definitions of quantum perfect
zero-knowledge. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper with some open problems.
2 Preliminaries
We assume the reader is familiar with classical zero-knowledge proof systems and quantum interactive proof sys-
tems. Detailed discussions of classical zero-knowledge proof systems can be found in Refs. [8, 9], for instance,
while quantum interactive proof systems are discussed in Refs. [33, 20, 23] and are reviewed in Appendix A. We
also assume familiarity with the quantum formalism, including the quantum circuit model and definitions of mixed
quantum states, admissible transformations (completely-positive trace-preserving mappings), trace norm, diamond
norm, and fidelity (all of which are discussed in detail in Refs. [25, 19], for instance).
Some of the notions and notations that are used in this paper are summarized in this section.
Throughout this paper, let N and Z+ denote the sets of positive and nonnegative integers, respectively. For
every d ∈ N, let Id denote the identity operator of dimension d. Also, for any Hilbert space H, let IH denote the
identity operator over H. In this paper, all Hilbert spaces are of dimension power of two.
2.1 Quantum Formalism
For any Hilbert spaces H and K, let D(H), U(H), and T(H,K) denote the sets of density operators over H,
unitary operators over H, and admissible transformations from H to K, respectively. For any Hilbert space H, let
|0H〉 denote the quantum state in H of which all the qubits are in state |0〉.
Let H and K be the Hilbert spaces and let Φ ∈ T(H,K) be an admissible transformation. Let N , X , and Y be
Hilbert spaces such that H⊗X = K⊗ Y = N . A unitary transformation UΦ ∈ U(N ) is a unitary realization of
Φ if trYUΦ
(
ρ⊗ |0X 〉〈0X |
)
U †Φ = Φ(ρ) for any ρ ∈ D(H).
The following approximate version of unitary equivalence is used in this paper.
Lemma 1 ([32]). For Hilbert spaces H and K, let |φ〉, |ψ〉 ∈ H ⊗ K satisfy that F (trK|φ〉〈φ|, trK|ψ〉〈ψ|) ≥ 1− ε
for some ε ∈ [0, 1]. Then there exists a unitary transformation U ∈ U(K) such that ‖(IH ⊗ U)|φ〉 − |ψ〉‖ ≤
√
2ε.
2.2 Quantum Circuits and Polynomial-Time Preparable Ensembles of Quantum States
It is assumed that any quantum circuit Q in this paper is unitary and is composed of gates in some reasonable,
universal, finite set of unitary quantum gates. For convenience, we may identify a circuit Q with the unitary
operator it induces.
Since non-unitary and unitary quantum circuits are equivalent in computational power [1], it is sufficient to
treat only unitary quantum circuits, which justifies the above assumption. For avoiding unnecessary complication,
however, the descriptions of procedures often include non-unitary operations in the subsequent sections. Even in
such cases, it is always possible to construct unitary quantum circuits that essentially achieve the same procedures
described. A quantum circuit Q is qin-in qout-out if it exactly implements a unitary realization UΦ of some qin-in
qout-out admissible transformation Φ. For convenience, we may identify a circuit Q with Φ in such a case. As
a special case of this, a quantum circuit Q is a generating circuit of a quantum state ρ of q qubits if it exactly
implements a unitary realization of a zero-in q-out admissible transformation that always outputs ρ.
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Following preceding studies on quantum interactive and zero-knowledge proofs, this paper uses the following
notion of polynomial-time uniformly generated families of quantum circuits.
A family {Qx} of quantum circuits is polynomial-time uniformly generated if there exists a deterministic pro-
cedure that, on every input x, outputs a description of Qx and runs in time polynomial in |x|. It is assumed that the
number of gates in any circuit is not more than the length of the description of that circuit. Hence Qx must have
size polynomial in |x|.
When proving statements concerning quantum perfect zero-knowledge proofs or proofs having perfect com-
pleteness, we assume that our universal gate set satisfies some conditions, since these “perfect” properties may not
hold with an arbitrary universal gate set. In fact, this is also the case for some previous studies on quantum interac-
tive or zero-knowledge proofs, including the papers by Kitaev and Watrous [20] and by Marriott and Watrous [23],
when deriving statements with perfect completeness property. The correctness of our results concerning quantum
perfect zero-knowledge proofs or proofs having perfect completeness may be discussed under a similar assumption
to those studies on the choice of the universal gate set. Fortunately, the author learned from John Watrous [35] that
the choice of the gate set would not be so critical and all the “perfect” properties claimed in Refs. [20, 23] and in this
paper hold with any gate set such that the Hadamard transformation and any classical reversible transformations
are exactly implementable. Note that this condition is satisfied by most of the standard gate sets including the Shor
basis [30] consisting of the Hadamard gate, the controlled-i-phase-shift gate, and the Toffoli gate. These subtle
issues regarding choices of the universal gate set will be explained in detail in Appendix B. It is stressed, however,
that all of our statements not concerning quantum perfect zero-knowledge proofs nor proofs having perfect com-
pleteness do hold for an arbitrary choice of the universal gate set (the completeness and soundness conditions may
become worse by negligible amounts in some of the claims, which does not matter for the final main statements).
Finally, this paper uses the following notion of polynomial-time preparable ensembles of quantum states, which
was introduced in Ref. [32].
An ensemble {ρx} of quantum states is polynomial-time preparable if there exists a polynomial-time uniformly
generated family {Qx} of quantum circuits such that each Qx is a generating circuit of ρx. In what follows, we
may use the notation {ρ(x)} instead of {ρx} for ensembles of quantum states simply for descriptional convenience.
2.3 Quantum Computational Indistinguishability
We use the notions of quantum computational indistinguishability introduced by Watrous [34]: polynomially quan-
tum indistinguishable ensembles of quantum states and polynomially quantum indistinguishable ensembles of ad-
missible transformations.
First, the quantum computational indistinguishability between two ensembles of quantum states is defined as
follows.
Definition 2. Let S ⊆ {0, 1}∗ be an infinite set and let m : Z+ → N be a polynomially bounded function. For
each x ∈ S, let ρx and σx be mixed states of m(|x|) qubits. The ensembles {ρx : x ∈ S} and {σx : x ∈ S} are
polynomially quantum indistinguishable if, for every choice of
• polynomially bounded functions k, p, s : Z+ → N,
• an ensemble {ξx : x ∈ S}, where ξx is a mixed state of k(|x|) qubits, and
• an (m(|x|) + k(|x|))-in 1-out quantum circuit Q of size at most s(|x|),
it holds that
|〈1|Q(ρx ⊗ ξx)|1〉 − 〈1|Q(σx ⊗ ξx)|1〉| < 1
p(|x|)
for all but finitely many x ∈ S.
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Next, the quantum computational indistinguishability between two ensembles of admissible transformations is
defined as follows.
Definition 3. Let S ⊆ {0, 1}∗ be an infinite set and let l,m : Z+ → N be polynomially bounded functions. For
each x ∈ S, let Φx and Ψx be l(|x|)-in m(|x|)-out admissible transformations. The ensembles {Φx : x ∈ S} and
{Ψx : x ∈ S} are polynomially quantum indistinguishable if, for every choice of
• polynomially bounded functions k, p, s : Z+ → N,
• an ensemble {ξx : x ∈ S}, where ξx is a mixed state of l(|x|) + k(|x|) qubits, and
• an (m(|x|) + k(|x|))-in 1-out quantum circuit Q of size at most s(|x|),
it holds that ∣∣〈1|Q((Φx ⊗ I2k(|x|))(ξx))|1〉 − 〈1|Q((Ψx ⊗ I2k(|x|))(ξx))|1〉∣∣ < 1p(|x|)
for all but finitely many x ∈ S.
In what follows, we will often use the term “computationally indistinguishable” instead of “polynomially quan-
tum indistinguishable” for simplicity. Also, we will often informally say that mixed states ρx and σx or admissi-
ble transformations Φx and Ψx are computationally indistinguishable when x ∈ S to mean that the ensembles
{ρx : x ∈ S} and {σx : x ∈ S} or {Φx : x ∈ S} and {Ψx : x ∈ S} are polynomially quantum indistinguishable.
2.4 Quantum Zero-Knowledge Proofs
For readability, in what follows, the arguments x and n are dropped in the various functions, if it is not confusing.
It is assumed that operators acting on subsystems of a given system are extended to the entire system by tensoring
with the identity, since it will be clear from context upon what part of a system a given operator acts. Although
all the statements in this paper can be proved only in terms of languages without using promise problems [6],
in what follows we define models and prove statements in terms of promise problems, for generality and for the
compatibility with some other studies on quantum zero-knowledge proofs [32, 21, 34, 3].
First we define the notions of various honest-verifier quantum zero-knowledge proofs following a manner
in Ref. [32] for the statistical zero-knowledge case. Given a quantum verifier V and a quantum prover P , let
viewV,P (x, j) be the quantum state that V possesses immediately after the jth transformation of P during an
execution of the protocol between V and P . In other words, viewV,P (x, j) is the state obtained by tracing out the
private space of P from the state of the entire system immediately after the jth transformation of P .
Now we define the classes HVQPZK(m, c, s), HVQSZK(m, c, s), and HVQZK(m, c, s) of problems having
m-message honest-verifier quantum perfect, statistical, and computational zero-knowledge proof systems, respec-
tively, with completeness accepting probability at least c and soundness accepting probability at most s.
Definition 4. Given a polynomially bounded function m : Z+ → N and functions c, s : Z+ → [0, 1], a problem
A = {Ayes, Ano} is in HVQPZK(m, c, s) iff there exists an m-message honest quantum verifier V and an m-
message honest quantum prover P such that
(Completeness and Soundness) (V, P ) forms an m-message quantum interactive proof system with completeness
accepting probability at least c and soundness accepting probability at most s,
(Honest-Verifier Perfect Zero-Knowledge) there exists a polynomial-time preparable ensembles {SV (x, j)} of
quantum states such that SV (x, j) = viewV,P (x, j) for every x ∈ Ayes and for each 1 ≤ j ≤
⌈m(|x|)
2
⌉
.
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Definition 5. Given a polynomially bounded function m : Z+ → N and functions c, s : Z+ → [0, 1], a problem
A = {Ayes, Ano} is in HVQSZK(m, c, s) iff there exists an m-message honest quantum verifier V and an m-
message honest quantum prover P such that
(Completeness and Soundness) (V, P ) forms an m-message quantum interactive proof system with completeness
accepting probability at least c and soundness accepting probability at most s,
(Honest-Verifier Statistical Zero-Knowledge) there exists a polynomial-time preparable ensembles {SV (x, j)} of
quantum states such that ‖SV (x, j) − viewV,P (x, j)‖tr is negligible with respect to |x| for all but finitely
many (x, j) ∈ Ayes ×
{
1, . . . ,
⌈m(|x|)
2
⌉}
.
Definition 6. Given a polynomially bounded function m : Z+ → N and functions c, s : Z+ → [0, 1], a problem
A = {Ayes, Ano} is in HVQZK(m, c, s) iff there exists an m-message honest quantum verifier V and an m-
message honest quantum prover P such that
(Completeness and Soundness) (V, P ) forms an m-message quantum interactive proof system with completeness
accepting probability at least c and soundness accepting probability at most s,
(Honest-Verifier Computational Zero-Knowledge) there exists a polynomial-time preparable ensembles
{SV (x, j)} of quantum states such that the ensembles
{
SV (x, j) : x ∈ Ayes and j ∈
{
1, . . . ,
⌈m(|x|)
2
⌉}}
and
{
viewV,P (x, j) : x ∈ Ayes and j ∈
{
1, . . . ,
⌈m(|x|)
2
⌉}}
are polynomially quantum indistinguishable.
Remark. In the original definition of honest-verifier quantum statistical zero-knowledge by Watrous [32], the sim-
ulator is required to simulate the quantum state that V possesses immediately after the jth message, for every j.
That is, regardless of whether the jth message is sent from P or from V , the simulator must be able to simulate
the quantum state that V possesses immediately after the jth message. In our definition, the simulator is required
to simulate it only when the jth message is from P . Notice, however, that every transformation of V is necessarily
simulatable by the simulator, which implies that our condition is sufficient and does not weaken the honest-verifier
zero-knowledge property.
Using these, we define the classes HVQPZK, HVQSZK, and HVQZK of problems having honest-verifier
quantum perfect, statistical, and computational zero-knowledge proof systems, respectively.
Definition 7. A problem A = {Ayes, Ano} is in HVQPZK if there exists a polynomially bounded function
m : Z+ → N such that A is in HVQPZK (m, 23 , 13).
Definition 8. A problem A = {Ayes, Ano} is in HVQSZK if there exists a polynomially bounded function
m : Z+ → N such that A is in HVQSZK (m, 23 , 13).
Definition 9. A problem A = {Ayes, Ano} is in HVQZK if there exists a polynomially bounded function
m : Z+ → N such that A is in HVQZK (m, 23 , 13).
Note that it is easy to see that we can amplify the success probability of honest-verifier quantum per-
fect/statistical/computational zero-knowledge proof systems by a sequential repetition, which justifies Defini-
tions 7, 8, and 9.
Next we define the notions of various quantum zero-knowledge proofs following a manner in Ref. [34].
Let V be an arbitrary quantum verifier. Suppose that V possesses some auxiliary quantum state in D(A) at the
beginning for some Hilbert spaceA, and possesses some quantum state in D(Z) after the protocol for some Hilbert
space Z . For such V , for any quantum prover P , and for every x ∈ {0, 1}∗, let 〈V, P 〉(x) denote the admissible
transformation in T(A,Z) induced by the interaction between V and P on input x. We call this 〈V, P 〉(x) the
induced admissible transformation from V , P , and x.
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We define the classes QPZK(m, c, s), QSZK(m, c, s), and QZK(m, c, s) of problems having m-message
quantum perfect, statistical, and computational zero-knowledge proof systems, respectively, with completeness
accepting probability at least c and soundness accepting probability at most s, as follows.
Definition 10. Given a polynomially bounded function m : Z+ → N and functions c, s : Z+ → [0, 1], a problem
A = {Ayes, Ano} is in QPZK(m, c, s) iff there exists an m-message honest quantum verifier V and an m-message
honest quantum prover P such that
(Completeness and Soundness) (V, P ) forms an m-message quantum interactive proof system with completeness
accepting probability at least c and soundness accepting probability at most s,
(Perfect Zero-Knowledge) for any m-message quantum verifier V ′, there exists a polynomial-time uniformly gen-
erated family {Qx} of quantum circuits, where each Qx exactly implements an admissible transformation
SV ′(x), such that SV ′(x) = 〈V ′, P 〉(x) for every x ∈ Ayes, where 〈V ′, P 〉(x) is the induced admissible
transformation from V ′, P , and x.
Definition 11. Given a polynomially bounded function m : Z+ → N and functions c, s : Z+ → [0, 1], a problem
A = {Ayes, Ano} is in QSZK(m, c, s) iff there exists an m-message honest quantum verifier V and an m-message
honest quantum prover P such that
(Completeness and Soundness) (V, P ) forms an m-message quantum interactive proof system with completeness
accepting probability at least c and soundness accepting probability at most s,
(Statistical Zero-Knowledge) for any m-message quantum verifier V ′, there exists a polynomial-time uniformly
generated family {Qx} of quantum circuits, where each Qx exactly implements an admissible transformation
SV ′(x), such that ‖SV ′(x)−〈V ′, P 〉(x)‖⋄ is negligible with respect to |x| for all but finitely many x ∈ Ayes,
where 〈V ′, P 〉(x) is the induced admissible transformation from V ′, P , and x.
Definition 12. Given a polynomially bounded function m : Z+ → N and functions c, s : Z+ → [0, 1], a problem
A = {Ayes, Ano} is in QZK(m, c, s) iff there exists an m-message honest quantum verifier V and an m-message
honest quantum prover P such that
(Completeness and Soundness) (V, P ) forms an m-message quantum interactive proof system with completeness
accepting probability at least c and soundness accepting probability at most s,
(Computational Zero-Knowledge) for any m-message quantum verifier V ′, there exists a polynomial-time uni-
formly generated family {Qx} of quantum circuits, where each Qx exactly implements an admissible trans-
formation SV ′(x), such that the ensembles {SV ′(x) : x ∈ Ayes} and {〈V ′, P 〉(x) : x ∈ Ayes} are polynomi-
ally quantum indistinguishable, where 〈V ′, P 〉(x) is the induced admissible transformation from V ′, P , and
x.
Using these, we define the classes QPZK, QSZK, and QZK of problems having quantum perfect, statistical,
and computational zero-knowledge proof systems, respectively.
Definition 13. A problem A = {Ayes, Ano} is in QPZK if there exists a polynomially bounded function
m : Z+ → N such that A is in QPZK (m, 23 , 13).
Definition 14. A problem A = {Ayes, Ano} is in QSZK if there exists a polynomially bounded function
m : Z+ → N such that A is in QSZK (m, 23 , 13).
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Definition 15. A problem A = {Ayes, Ano} is in QZK if there exists a polynomially bounded function
m : Z+ → N such that A is in QZK (m, 23 , 13).
Note that again it is not hard to see that we can amplify the success probability of quantum per-
fect/statistical/computational zero-knowledge proof systems by a sequential repetition, which justifies Defini-
tions 13, 14, and 15.
Remark. It is noted that, in the classical case, the most common definition of perfect zero-knowledge proofs seems
to allow the simulator to output “FAIL” with small probability, say, with probability at most 12 [8, 28]. Adopting
this convention leads to alternative definitions of honest-verifier and general quantum perfect zero-knowledge proof
systems. At a glance, these two types of definitions seem likely to form different complexity classes of quantum
perfect zero-knowledge proofs. Fortunately, it is proved from our results shown in Section 3 that it is not the case
and the two types of definitions result in the same complexity class of quantum perfect zero-knowledge proofs. It
is stressed that such equivalence is not known in the classical case. See Section 6 for further discussions on the
definitions of quantum perfect zero-knowledge.
3 Perfect Zero-Knowledge Case
We first discuss the case of quantum perfect zero-knowledge proofs. This gives a unified framework that works well
for all of quantum perfect, statistical, and computational zero-knowledge proofs. Although we need very careful
modifications of the protocols that are necessary only for the perfect zero-knowledge case, once we have presented
how to modify the protocols, we can avoid complications arising from imperfect zero-knowledge conditions when
proving zero-knowledge property. Indeed, the cases of quantum computational and statistical zero-knowledge
proofs are proved in almost same ways, as will be discussed later, except that we need bit more complicated
arguments when proving zero-knowledge conditions.
3.1 Parallelization of Honest-Verifier Quantum Perfect Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems
This subsection proves that any honest-verifier quantum perfect zero-knowledge proof system that involves poly-
nomially many messages can be parallelized to one that involves only three messages.
In the case of usual quantum interactive proofs, Kitaev and Watrous [20] proved the parallelizability to three
messages. Here we modify their method so that it works well with honest-verifier quantum perfect zero-knowledge
proofs. Actually, the method due to Kitaev and Watrous works well even in the cases of honest-verifier quantum
statistical or computational zero-knowledge proofs (if the completeness error is negligible, which may be assumed
without loss of generality since the success probability can be amplified by sequential repetition), and thus, we do
not need our modified version in these cases. However, we do need our modified version in the case of honest-
verifier quantum perfect zero-knowledge proofs, since the Kitaev-Watrous method may not preserve the perfect
zero-knowledge property for proof systems of imperfect completeness. We explain this in more detail.
The main idea in the original parallelization protocol in Ref. [20] is that the verifier receives each snapshot state
of the underlying protocol as the first message, and then checks if the following three properties are satisfied: (i) the
first snapshot state is a legal state in the underlying protocol after the first message, (ii) the last snapshot state can
make the original verifier accept, and (iii) any two consecutive snapshot states are indeed transformable with each
other by one round of communication. In order to check these three, at the first transformation of the verifier in the
original parallelization protocol in Ref. [20], he first checks if the conditions (i) and (ii) really hold for the received
snapshot states, which aims to prevent a dishonest prover from preparing any illegal sequence of snapshot states
that can pass the check for the condition (iii) by violating the conditions on the initial and last snapshot states. The
problem arises here, in the check for the last snapshot state, when we want to parallelize a protocol of honest-verifier
quantum perfect zero-knowledge with imperfect completeness. Because of imperfect completeness, the verifier’s
check can fail even if the honest prover prepares every snapshot state honestly, which means that the verifier’s check
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causes a small perturbation to the snapshot states. Now we have difficulty in perfectly simulating the behavior of
the honest prover with respect to this perturbed state, which causes the loss of the perfect zero-knowledge property.
To avoid this difficulty, we modify the parallelization protocol as follows. Our basic idea is to postpone the
verifier’s check for the last snapshot state until after the third message. At the final verification of the verifier,
he either carries out the postponed check for the last snapshot state with probability 12 , or just carries out the
original final verification procedure with probability 12 . Now the honest-verifier perfect zero-knowledge property
becomes straightforward, since there is no perturbation to all the snapshot states until after the last transformation
of the verifier. The completeness property cannot become worse than that in the original protocol. However, the
soundness condition now becomes a bit harder to prove, because we can no longer assume that a sequence of
snapshot states prepared by a dishonest prover satisfies the condition (ii), when analyzing the probability to pass
the transformability test for (iii). To overcome this, we show a general property in quantum information theory in
Lemma 16, which is a generalization of Lemma 5 in Ref. [20]. This generalization enables us to analyze the case
in which the last snapshot state may not necessarily make the original verifier accept, and thus, has much more
flexibility than Lemma 5 in Ref. [20], which is applicable only to the case in which the last snapshot state makes
the original verifier accept with certainty.
Lemma 16. Let V and M be any Hilbert spaces. For a positive integer k ≥ 2 and ε, δ ∈ [0, 1] such that
ε < δ, suppose that a sequence of unitary operators V1, . . . , Vk ∈ U(V ⊗M) and a projection operator Π act-
ing over V ⊗M onto some subspace of V ⊗M satisfy that ‖ΠVkPk−1Vk−1 · · ·P1V1|0V⊗M⊗P〉‖2 ≤ 1− δ for
any Hilbert space P and any sequence of unitary operators P1, . . . , Pk−1 ∈ U(M⊗P). Then, for any sequence
ρ1, . . . , ρk ∈ D(V ⊗M) such that ρ1 = |0V⊗M〉〈0V⊗M| and trΠVkρkV †k ≥ 1− ε,
k−1∑
j=1
F (trMVjρjV
†
j , trMρj+1) ≤ (k − 1)−
(
√
1− ε−√1− δ)2
2(k − 1) .
Proof. Let P be a sufficiently large Hilbert space so that we can take a purification |ψj〉 ∈ V ⊗M⊗P
of ρj for each 2 ≤ j ≤ k − 1, and let |ψ1〉 = |0V⊗M⊗P〉. Notice that |ψ1〉 is a purification of ρ1, and
Vj|ψj〉 is a purification of VjρjV †j , for each 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1. Let ∆j = 1− F (trMVjρjV †j , trMρj+1) for each
1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1. It follows from Lemma 1 that there exists a unitary transformation Pj ∈ U(M⊗P) such that
‖|ψj+1〉 − PjVj |ψj〉‖ ≤
√
2∆j , for each 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1. Hence we have
‖ΠVk|ψk〉 −ΠVkPk−1Vk−1 · · ·P1V1|ψ1〉‖
≤ ‖Vk|ψk〉 − VkPk−1Vk−1 · · ·P1V1|ψ1〉‖
= ‖|ψk〉 − Pk−1Vk−1 · · ·P1V1|ψ1〉‖
≤ ‖|ψk〉 − Pk−1Vk−1|ψk−1〉‖+
k−2∑
j=1
‖Pk−1Vk−1 · · ·Pj+1Vj+1|ψj+1〉 − Pk−1Vk−1 · · ·PjVj|ψj〉‖
=
k−1∑
j=1
‖|ψj+1〉 − PjVj|ψj〉‖
≤
k−1∑
j=1
√
2∆j .
On the other hand,
‖ΠVk|ψk〉‖ ≤ ‖ΠVk|ψk〉 −ΠVkPk−1Vk−1 · · ·P1V1|ψ1〉‖+ ‖ΠVkPk−1Vk−1 · · ·P1V1|ψ1〉‖
≤
k−1∑
j=1
√
2∆j +
√
1− δ.
10
Notice that ‖ΠVk|ψk〉‖ ≥
√
1− ε, since |ψk〉 is a purification of ρk and trΠVkρkV †k ≥ 1− ε. Therefore,
k−1∑
j=1
√
∆j ≥
√
1− ε−√1− δ√
2
,
and thus,
k−1∑
j=1
F (trMVjρjV
†
j , trMρj+1) =
k−1∑
j=1
(1−∆j) = (k − 1)−
k−1∑
j=1
∆j ≤ (k − 1)− (
√
1− ε−√1− δ)2
2(k − 1) ,
as desired. 
Using Lemma 16, we can show that our modified parallelization protocol above indeed works well, and we
have the following lemma.
Lemma 17. Let m : Z+ → N be a polynomially bounded function and let ε, δ : Z+ → [0, 1] be any functions such
that m ≥ 4 and ε < δ2
16(m+1)2
. Then, HVQPZK(m, 1− ε, 1 − δ) ⊆ HVQPZK
(
3, 1 − ε2 , 1− δ
2
32(m+1)2
)
.
Proof. Let A = {Ayes, Ano} be a problem in HVQPZK(m, 1− ε, 1− δ) and let V be the corresponding m-
message honest quantum verifier. For simplicity, it is assumed that m takes only even values (if m(n) is odd
for some n ∈ Z+, we modify the protocol so that the verifier sends a “dummy” message to a prover as the first
message when the input has length n such that m(n) is odd). Let V be the quantum register consisting of all the
qubits in the private space of V , and let M be that consisting of all the qubits in the message channel between V and
the prover. For every input x, V applies Vj for his jth transformation to the qubits in (V,M) for 1 ≤ j ≤ m2 + 1, and
performs the measurement Π = {Πacc,Πrej} at the end of the original protocol to decide acceptance or rejection.
We construct a protocol of a three-message honest quantum verifier W .
For every input x, at the first message the new verifier W receives quantum registers Vj and Mj from the
prover, for 2 ≤ j ≤ m2 + 1, where each Vj and Mj consist of the same number of qubits as V and M, respectively.
W expects that the qubits in (Vj ,Mj) form the quantum state the original m-message verifier V would possess just
after the 2(j − 1)-st message (i.e., just before the jth transformation of the verifier) of the original protocol, for
2 ≤ j ≤ m2 + 1.
Now W prepares quantum registers V1 and M1, which consist of the same number of qubits as V and M,
respectively, and also prepares single-qubit quantum registers X and Y. W initializes all the qubits in V1 and M1
to state |0〉, while prepares |Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉|0〉 + |1〉|1〉) in (X,Y). W then chooses r ∈ {1, . . . , m2 } uniformly at
random, applies Vr to the qubits in (Vr,Mr), and sends Y and Mr together with r to the prover.
At the third message, W receives the quantum registers Y and Mr from the prover. Now W chooses b ∈ {0, 1}
uniformly at random. If b = 0, W applies Vm
2
+1 to the qubits in (Vm
2
+1,Mm
2
+1), and accepts if and only if the
content of (Vm
2
+1,Mm
2
+1) corresponds to an accepting state in the original protocol. On the other hand, if b = 1,
W first performs a controlled-swap between (Vr,Mr) and (Vr+1,Mr+1) using the qubit in X as the control, then
performs a controlled-not over the qubits in (X,Y) again using the qubit in X as the control, and finally applies the
Hadamard transformation to the qubit in X. W accepts if and only if the qubit in X is in state |0〉.
The precise description of the protocol of W is found in Figure 1.
For the completeness, suppose that the input x is in Ayes.
Let P be the m-message honest quantum prover for the original proof system, and let P be the quantum register
consisting of all the qubits in the private space of P . Denote by V , M, and P the Hilbert spaces corresponding
to the registers V, M, and P, respectively. Let |ψ1〉 = |0V⊗M⊗P〉 be the quantum state in (V,M,P), and let
|ψj〉 ∈ V ⊗M⊗P be the quantum state in (V,M,P) just after the 2(j − 1)-st message (i.e., just before the jth
transformation of the verifier) of the original protocol if V communicates with P on input x, for 2 ≤ j ≤ m2 + 1.
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Honest Verifier’s Three-Message Protocol
1. Receive quantum registers Vj and Mj from the prover, for 2 ≤ j ≤ m2 + 1.
2. Prepare quantum registers V1 and M1 and single-qubit quantum registers X and Y. Initialize all the qubits
in V1 and M1 to state |0〉, and prepare |Φ+〉 = 1√2 (|0〉|0〉 + |1〉|1〉) in (X,Y). Choose r ∈
{
1, . . . , m2
}
uni-
formly at random and apply Vr to the qubits in (Vr,Mr). Send Y and Mr together with r to the prover.
3. Receive the quantum registers Y and Mr from the prover. Choose b ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random.
3.1 If b = 0, do the following:
Apply Vm
2
+1 to the qubits in (Vm
2
+1,Mm
2
+1). Accept if the content of (Vm
2
+1,Mm
2
+1) corresponds to
an accepting state in the original protocol, and reject otherwise.
3.2 If b = 1, do the following:
Perform a controlled-swap between (Vr,Mr) and (Vr+1,Mr+1) using the qubit in X as the control,
and then perform a controlled-not over the qubits in (X,Y) again using the qubit in X as the control.
Apply the Hadamard transformation to the qubit in X. Accept if the qubit in X is in state |0〉, and reject
otherwise.
Figure 1: Honest verifier’s three-message protocol.
Let R be the honest quantum prover in the constructed three-message system. In addition to the registers Vj
and Mj , R prepares the quantum register Pj in his private space, for 1 ≤ j ≤ m2 + 1, where each Pj consists of the
same number of qubits as P. R prepares |0P 〉 in P1 so that the qubits in (V1,M1,P1) form |ψ1〉. At the first message
of the constructed protocol, R generates |ψj〉 in (Vj ,Mj,Pj), and sends Vj and Mj to W , for each 2 ≤ j ≤ m2 + 1.
At the third message, if R receives r together with the registers Y and Mr, R applies Pr to the qubits in
(Mr,Pr), where Pj is the jth transformation of the original prover P for each 1 ≤ j ≤ m2 , and then performs a
controlled-swap between Pr and Pr+1 using the qubit in Y as the control. R then sends Y and Mr back to W .
It is obvious that R can convince W with probability at least 1− ε if b = 0 is chosen by W at Step 3, since the
qubits in (Vm
2
+1,Mm
2
+1) form the quantum state trP |ψm
2
+1〉〈ψm
2
+1|. From the construction of R, it is also routine
to show that R can convince W with certainty if b = 1 is chosen by W at Step 3, since PrVr|ψr〉 = |ψr+1〉 for any
r chosen from
{
1, . . . , m2
}
. Hence, W accepts every input x ∈ Ayes with probability at least 1− ε2 .
Next, for the soundness, suppose that the input x is in Ano.
Let R′ be any three-message quantum prover for the constructed proof system. Let ρj ∈ D(V ⊗M) be the
reduced state in (Vj,Mj) of the entire system state just after the first transformation ofR′, for each 1 ≤ j ≤ m2 + 1.
Consider the case in which W chooses r from
{
1, . . . , m2
}
in Step 2 and also chooses b = 1 at Step 3. Then
the probability that R′ can convince W in this case cannot be larger than 12 +
1
2F (trMVrρrV
†
r , trMρr+1) by an
argument similar to that in the proof of Theorem 4 in Ref. [20]. Hence, the probability that R′ can convince W
when b = 1 is chosen at Step 3 is at most 12 +
1
m
∑m
2
j=1 F (trMVjρjV
†
j , trMρj+1).
Now, if trΠaccVm
2
+1ρm
2
+1V
†
m
2
+1 ≥ 1− δ4 , Lemma 16 implies that
m
2∑
j=1
F (trMVjρjV
†
j , trMρj+1)
≤ m
2
− 1
m
(√
1− δ
4
−√1− δ
)2
≤ m
2
− 1
m
[(
1− δ
4
)
−
(
1− δ
2
)]2
=
m
2
− δ
2
16m
,
12
and thus, the probability that R′ can convince W when b = 1 is chosen is at most 12 +
1
m
(
m
2 − δ
2
16m
)
= 1− δ2
16m2
.
On the other hand, if trΠaccVm
2
+1ρm
2
+1V
†
m
2
+1 ≤ 1− δ4 , it is obvious that R′ can convince W with probability
at most 1− δ4 ≤ 1− δ
2
16m2
if b = 0 is chosen by W at Step 3, since the qubits in Vm
2
+1 and Mm
2
+1 are never
touched by the prover after Step 1.
Hence the probability that R′ can convince W for every input x ∈ Ano is at most 1− δ232m2 . Taking it into
account that m(n) may be odd for some n ∈ Z+, we have the bound of 1− δ232(m+1)2 .
Finally, the perfect zero-knowledge property against W is almost straightforward.
Let SV be the simulator for the original m-message system such that, if x is in Ayes, the states SV (x, j) and
viewV,P (x, j) are identical for each 1 ≤ j ≤ m2 .
The simulator TW for the constructed three-message system behaves as follows. For convenience, let R be the
quantum register that is used to store the classical information r chosen byW , and let SV (x, 0) = |0V⊗M〉〈0V⊗M|.
To simulate the state just after the first transformation of the prover R, TW prepares the state SV (x, j − 1) in
(Vj,Mj), for each 2 ≤ j ≤ m2 + 1, and outputs the state in (V2,M2, . . . ,Vm2 +1,Mm2 +1) as TW (x, 1).
To simulate the state just after the second transformation of the prover R, TW first chooses r ∈
{
1, . . . , m2
}
uniformly at random, and sets the content of R to r. Next TW prepares the state SV (x, j − 1) in (Vj ,Mj), for each
1 ≤ j ≤ r − 1 and r + 1 ≤ j ≤ m2 + 1, and prepares the state SV (x, r) in (Vr,Mr). TW then prepares the state
|Φ+〉 in (X,Y), and performs a controlled-swap between (Vr,Mr) and (Vr+1,Mr+1) using the qubit in X as the
control. Now TW outputs the state in (R,X,Y,V1,M1, . . . ,Vm
2
+1,Mm
2
+1) as TW (x, 2).
It is obvious that the ensemble {TW (x, j)} is polynomial-time preparable.
Suppose that x is in Ayes.
That TW (x, 1) = viewW,R(x, 1) is obvious from the fact that SV (x, j) = viewV,P (x, j) for 1 ≤ j ≤ m2 .
To show that TW (x, 2) = viewW,R(x, 2), let viewV,P (x, 0) = SV (x, 0) = |0V⊗M〉〈0V⊗M|, for convenience.
Let σr and ξr be the quantum states in (R,X,Y,V1,M1, . . . ,Vm
2
+1,Mm
2
+1) such that
σr = |r〉〈r| ⊗ |Φ+〉〈Φ+| ⊗ SV (x, 0) ⊗ · · · ⊗ SV (x, r − 2)⊗ SV (x, r)⊗ SV (x, r)⊗ · · · ⊗ SV
(
x,
m
2
)
and
ξr = |r〉〈r| ⊗ |Φ+〉〈Φ+|
⊗ viewV,P (x, 0) ⊗ · · · ⊗ viewV,P (x, r − 2)⊗ viewV,P (x, r)⊗ viewV,P (x, r)⊗ · · · ⊗ viewV,P
(
x,
m
2
)
for each 1 ≤ r ≤ m2 . Then, we have σr = ξr for each 1 ≤ r ≤ m2 , since SV (x, j) = viewV,P (x, j) for 0 ≤ j ≤ m2 .
For each 1 ≤ r ≤ m2 , let σ′r and ξ′r be the quantum states obtained by performing a controlled-swap between
(Vr,Mr) and (Vr+1,Mr+1) on σr and ξr, respectively, using the qubit in X as the control. Obviously, σ′r = ξ′r
for each 1 ≤ r ≤ m2 . By definition, TW (x, 2) = 2m
∑m
2
r=1 σ
′
r. Furthermore, viewW,R(x, 2) is exactly the state
2
m
∑m
2
r=1 ξ
′
r. Now that TW (x, 2) = viewW,R(x, 2) follows from the fact that σ′r = ξ′r for each 1 ≤ r ≤ m2 .
Hence the honest-verifier perfect zero-knowledge property against W follows. 
Next we show that the parallel repetition theorem for three-message quantum interactive proofs may be ex-
tended to the case of three-message honest-verifier quantum perfect zero-knowledge proof systems.
Lemma 18. Let c, s : Z+ → [0, 1] be any functions such that c > s. Then, for any polynomially bounded function
k : Z+ → N, HVQPZK(3, c, s) ⊆ HVQPZK(3, ck, sk). More strongly, let Π be any three-message honest-verifier
quantum perfect zero-knowledge proof system for a problem A = {Ayes, Ano} with completeness accepting proba-
bility at least c(n) and soundness accepting probability at most s(n) for every input of length n. Consider another
proof system Π′ such that, for every input of length n, Π′ carries out k(n) attempts of Π in parallel and accepts iff
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all the k(n) attempts result in acceptance in Π. Then Π′ is a three-message honest-verifier quantum perfect zero-
knowledge proof system for A with completeness accepting probability at least c(n)k(n) and soundness accepting
probability at most s(n)k(n) for every input of length n.
Proof. The completeness and soundness conditions follow from the proof of Theorem 6 in Ref. [20]. The honest-
verifier perfect zero-knowledge property is trivial. Let V be the honest quantum verifier in the original three-
message system Π and let SV be the corresponding simulator such that, if x is in Ayes, the state SV (x, j) perfectly
simulates V ’s view after the jth transformation of the honest quantum prover, for each 1 ≤ j ≤ 2. Let W be the
honest quantum verifier in the constructed three-message system Π′. For every x and for each 1 ≤ j ≤ 2, the
simulator TW for Π′ just outputs TW (x, j) = SV (x, j)⊗k(|x|). Now the honest-verifier perfect zero-knowledge
property is obvious. 
From Lemmas 17 and 18, it is immediate to show the following lemma.
Lemma 19. For any polynomially bounded function p : Z+ → N, HVQPZK ⊆ HVQPZK(3, 1 − 2−p, 2−p).
Proof. By sequential repetition, we can show that, for any polynomially bounded function m : Z+ → N, for
any functions c, s : Z+ → [0, 1] that satisfy c− s ≥ 1q for some polynomially bounded function q : Z+ → N,
and for any polynomially bounded function p : Z+ → N, there exists a polynomially bounded func-
tion m′ : Z+ → N such that HVQPZK(m, c, s) ⊆ HVQPZK(m′, 1− 2−p2 , 2−p2). Now Lemma 17 implies
that HVQPZK(m′, 1− 2−p2 , 2−p2) ⊆ HVQPZK
(
3, 1 − 2−p2−1, 1− (1−2−p
2
)2
32(m′+1)2
)
. Finally, by parallel repe-
tition for sufficiently many times (say, for 32p(|x|)(m′(|x|) + 2)2 times), from Lemma 18, we have that
HVQPZK
(
3, 1 − 2−p2−1, 1 − (1−2−p
2
)2
32(m′+1)2
)
⊆ HVQPZK(3, 1 − 2−p, 2−p), which completes the proof. 
3.2 Converting Honest-Verifier Quantum Perfect Zero-Knowledge Proofs to Public-Coin Systems
Next we show that any three-message honest-verifier quantum perfect zero-knowledge system can be modified to
a three-message public-coin one in which the message from the verifier consists of only one classical bit. Mar-
riott and Watrous [23] showed such a claim in the case of usual quantum interactive proofs. We show that their
construction preserves the honest-verifier perfect zero-knowledge property.
Lemma 20. Let ε, δ : Z+ → [0, 1] be any functions that satisfy δ > 1− (1− ε)2. Then, any problem having a
three-message honest-verifier quantum perfect zero-knowledge system with completeness accepting probability at
least 1− ε and soundness accepting probability at most 1− δ has a three-message public-coin honest-verifier
quantum perfect zero-knowledge system with completeness accepting probability at least 1− ε2 and soundness
accepting probability at most 12 +
√
1−δ
2 in which the message from the verifier consists of only one classical bit.
Proof. The proof is essentially same as that of Theorem 5.4 in Ref. [23] except for the zero-knowledge property.
LetA = {Ayes, Ano} be a problem inHVQPZK(3, 1 − ε, 1− δ) and let V be the corresponding three-message
quantum verifier. Let V be the quantum register consisting of all the qubits in the private space of V , and let M be
that consisting of all the qubits in the message channel between V and the prover. For every input x, V applies V1
and V2 on the qubits in (V,M) for his first and second transformations, respectively. We construct a protocol of a
three-message public-coin quantum verifier W .
For every input x, at the first message the constructed verifier W receives the quantum register V from the
prover. W expects that the prover prepares the quantum register M in his private space and the qubits in (V,M)
form the quantum state the original verifier V would possess just after the second message (i.e., just after the first
transformation of V ) of the original protocol.
At the second message, W chooses b ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random and sends b to the prover.
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Honest Verifier’s Protocol in Three-Message Public-Coin System
1. Receive a quantum register V from the prover.
2. Choose b ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random. Send b to the prover.
3. Receive a quantum register M from the prover.
3.1 If b = 0, apply V2 to the qubits in (V,M). Accept if the content of (V,M) corresponds to an accepting
state of the original protocol, and reject otherwise.
3.2 If b = 1, apply V †1 to the qubits in (V,M). Accept if all the qubits in V are in state |0〉, and reject
otherwise.
Figure 2: Honest verifier’s protocol in a three-message public-coin system.
If b = 0, the prover is requested to send M, so that the qubits in (V,M) form the quantum state the original
verifier V would possess just after the third message (i.e., just after the second transformation of the prover) of
the original protocol. Now W applies V2 to the qubits in (V,M) and accepts if and only if the content of (V,M)
corresponds to an accepting state of the original protocol.
On the other hand, if b = 1, the prover is requested to send M so that the qubits in (V,M) form the quantum
state the original verifier V would possess just after the second message (i.e., just after the first transformation of
V ) of the original protocol. Now W applies V †1 to the qubits in (V,M) and accepts if and only if all the qubits in V
are in state |0〉.
The precise description of the protocol of W is found in Figure 2.
First suppose that the input x is in Ayes.
Let P be the three-message honest quantum prover for the original proof system, and let P be the quantum
register consisting of all the qubits in the private space of P . Let |ψ2〉 be the quantum state in (V,M,P) just after
the second message (i.e., just after the first transformation of V ) of the original protocol if V communicates with
P on input x.
Let R be the honest prover in the constructed public-coin system. In addition to the registers V and M, R
prepares the quantum register P in his private space. At the first message of the constructed protocol, R first
generates |ψ2〉 in (V,M,P) and then sends V to W .
At the third message of the constructed protocol, if b = 0, R first applies P2 to the qubits in (M,P), and then
sends M to W , where P2 is the second transformation of the original prover P on input x in the original protocol,
while if b = 1, R does nothing and just sends M to W .
It is obvious that R can convince W with probability at least 1− ε if b = 0, and with certainty if b = 1. Hence,
W accepts every input x ∈ Ayes with probability at least 1− ε2 .
The soundness property for the case the input x is in Ano follows with exactly the same argument as in the
proof of Theorem 5.4 in Ref. [23].
Finally, the perfect zero-knowledge property against W is almost straightforward.
Let SV be the simulator for V in the original system such that, if x is in Ayes, the states SV (x, j) and
viewV,P (x, j) are identical for each 1 ≤ j ≤ 2. Let M be the Hilbert space corresponding to the quantum reg-
ister M. The simulator TW for the constructed public-coin system behaves as follows. For convenience, let R be
the single-qubit register that is used to store the classical information representing the outcome b of a public coin
flipped by W .
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Let TW (x, 1) and TW (x, 2) be quantum states in V and in (R,V,M), respectively, defined by
TW (x, 1) = trMV1SV (x, 1)V
†
1 ,
TW (x, 2) =
1
2
[|0〉〈0| ⊗ SV (x, 2) + |1〉〈1| ⊗ (V1SV (x, 1)V †1 )].
It is obvious that the ensemble {TW (x, j)} is polynomial-time preparable.
Suppose that x is in Ayes. It is obvious that TW (x, 1) = viewW,R(x, 1), since TW (x, 1) = trMV1SV (x, 1)V †1 ,
view(W,R)1 = trMV1viewV,P (x, 1)V
†
1 , and SV (x, 1) = viewV,P (x, 1). The fact TW (x, 2) = viewW,R(x, 2)
follows from the properties viewW,R(x, 2) = 12
[|0〉〈0| ⊗ viewV,P (x, 2) + |1〉〈1| ⊗ (V1viewV,P (x, 1)V †1 )],
SV (x, 1) = viewV,P (x, 1), and SV (x, 2) = viewV,P (x, 2).
Hence the claim follows. 
3.3 HVQPZK = QPZK
First notice that the quantum rewinding technique due to Watrous [34] perfectly works well for any three-message
public-coin honest-verifier quantum perfect zero-knowledge protocol in which the message from the verifier con-
sists of only one classical bit. That is, we can show the following lemma.
Lemma 21. Any three-message public-coin honest-verifier quantum perfect zero-knowledge system such that the
message from the verifier consists of only one classical bit is perfect zero-knowledge against any polynomial-time
quantum verifier.
Proof. Let A = {Ayes, Ano} be a problem having a three-message public-coin honest-verifier quantum perfect
zero-knowledge system such that the message from the verifier consists of only one classical bit. Let V and P be
the corresponding three-message public-coin honest quantum verifier and three-message honest quantum prover,
respectively. Let M and N be the quantum registers consisting of all the qubits sent to V at the first message and
of those at the third message, respectively, and let R and S be the single-qubit registers that are used to store the
classical information representing the outcome b of a public coin flipped by V , where R is inside the private space
of V and S is sent to P .
Let SV be the simulator for V such that, if x is in Ayes, the states SV (x, 1) and viewV,P (x, 1) consisting
of qubits in M are identical and the states SV (x, 2) and viewV,P (x, 2) consisting of qubits in (M,N,R) are also
identical.
Consider a generating circuit Q of the quantum state SV (x, 2). Without loss of generality, it is assumed that Q
acts over the qubits in (M,N,R,A), where A is the quantum register consisting of qA qubits for some polynomially
bounded function qA : Z+ → N.
For any polynomial-time quantum verifier W and any auxiliary quantum state ρ for W stored in the quantum
register X inside the private space of W , we construct an efficiently implementable admissible mapping Φ that
corresponds to a simulator TW for W . Without loss of generality it is assumed that the message from W consists
of a single classical bit, since the honest prover can easily enforce this constraint by measuring the message from
the verifier before responding to it. Let W be the quantum register consisting of all the qubits in the private space
of W except for those in X and M after having sent the second message. We consider the procedure described in
Figure 3, which is the implementation of Φ.
Suppose that the input x is in Ayes.
Since the state viewV,P (x, 2) can be written of the form viewV,P (x, 2) = 12 (σ0 ⊗ |0〉〈0| + σ1 ⊗ |1〉〈1|)
for some quantum states σ0 and σ1 in (M,N), the state SV (x, 2) must also be of the form
SV (x, 2) =
1
2(σ0 ⊗ |0〉〈0| + σ1 ⊗ |1〉〈1|) from the honest-verifier perfect zero-knowledge property. Therefore,
the probability of obtaining |0〉 as the measurement result in Step 5 is exactly equal to 12 regardless of the auxiliary
quantum state ρ, because trNσ0 = trNσ1 holds from the honest-verifier perfect zero-knowledge property of the
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Simulator for General Verifier W
1. Store the auxiliary quantum state ρ in the quantum register X. Prepare the quantum registers S, W, M, N, R,
and A, and further prepare a single qubit quantum register F. Initialize all the qubits in F, S, W, M, N, R, and
A in state |0〉.
2. Apply the generating circuit Q of the quantum state SV (x, 2) to the qubits in (M,N,R,A).
3. Apply W1 to the qubits in (S,W,X,M), where W1 is the first transformation of the simulated verifier W .
4. Compute the exclusive-or of the contents of R and S and write the result in F.
5. Measure the qubit in F in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis. If this results in |0〉, output the qubits in (W,X,M,N,R),
otherwise apply W †1 to the qubits in (S,W,X,M) and then apply Q† to the qubits in (M,N,R,A).
6. Apply the phase-flip if all the qubits in F, S, W, M, N, R, and A are in state |0〉, apply Q to the qubits in
(M,N,R,A), and apply W1 to the qubits in (S,W,X,M). Output the qubits in (W,X,M,N,R).
Figure 3: Simulator for a general verifier W .
protocol, whereN is the Hilbert space corresponding to N (recall that when communicating with the honest verifier
V , the qubits in M are never touched by V until the final transformation of V ).
Let ξi = ΠiW1(|0S⊗W〉〈0S⊗W | ⊗ ρ⊗ σi ⊗ |i〉〈i|)W †1Πi be an unnormalized state in (S,W,X,M,N,R) for
each i ∈ {0, 1}, where Πi = |i〉〈i| is the projection operator over the qubit in S, and S and W are the Hilbert
spaces corresponding to S and W, respectively. Then, conditioned on the measurement result being |0〉 in Step 5,
the output is the state trS(ξ0 + ξ1).
Noticing that trS ξitrξi is exactly the state the verifier W would possess after the third message when the second
message from W is i and that the probability of the second message from W being i is exactly equal to trξi for
each i ∈ {0, 1}, trS(ξ0 + ξ1) = trξ0 · trS ξ0trξ0 + trξ1 · trS
ξ1
trξ1
is exactly the state W would possess after the third
message. Thus, the quantum rewinding technique due to Watrous [34] perfectly works well, which is implemented
in Steps 5 and 6.
This ensures the perfect zero-knowledge property against W , which completes the proof. 
From Lemma 21, it is immediate to show that HVQPZK = QPZK, i.e., honest-verifier quantum perfect zero-
knowledge equals general quantum perfect zero-knowledge.
Theorem 22. HVQPZK = QPZK.
Proof. That HVQPZK ⊇ QPZK is trivial and we show that HVQPZK ⊆ QPZK. Now Lemma 21 together with
Lemmas 19 and 20 implies that HVQPZK ⊆ QPZK
(
3, 1 − 2−p, 12 + 2−
p
2
−1
)
for any polynomially bounded
function p : Z+ → N. Therefore, the fact that sequential repetition works well for the protocols of quantum zero-
knowledge proofs establishes the statement. 
From the proof of Theorem 22, the following property also follows.
Theorem 23. Any problem in QPZK has a public-coin quantum perfect zero-knowledge proof system.
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4 Computational Zero-Knowledge Case
4.1 HVQZK = QZK
With essentially same arguments as in the perfect zero-knowledge case, we can show that honest-verifier quantum
zero-knowledge equals general quantum zero-knowledge for the computational zero-knowledge case.
First, we show the following lemma, which is the computational zero-knowledge version of Lemma 17. The
proof is exactly the same as the proof of Lemma 17 except for the zero-knowledge property and the honest-verifier
computational zero-knowledge property can be proved by fairly straightforward hybrid arguments.
Lemma 24. Let m : Z+ → N be a polynomially bounded function and let ε, δ : Z+ → [0, 1] be any functions such
that m ≥ 4 and ε < δ2
16(m+1)2
. Then, HVQZK(m, 1− ε, 1 − δ) ⊆ HVQZK
(
3, 1 − ε2 , 1− δ
2
32(m+1)2
)
.
Alternatively, we may show the computational zero-knowledge version of Theorem 4 in Ref. [20].
Next we show that the parallel repetition theorem for three-message quantum interactive proofs may be ex-
tended to the case of three-message honest-verifier quantum computational zero-knowledge proof systems, which
is the the computational zero-knowledge version of Lemma 18. Again the proof is exactly the same as the proof of
Lemma 18 except for the zero-knowledge property and the honest-verifier computational zero-knowledge property
can be proved by fairly straightforward hybrid arguments.
Lemma 25. Let c, s : Z+ → [0, 1] be any functions such that c > s. Then, for any polynomially bounded function
k : Z+ → N, HVQZK(3, c, s) ⊆ HVQZK(3, ck, sk). More strongly, let Π be any three-message honest-verifier
quantum computational zero-knowledge proof system for a problem A = {Ayes, Ano} with completeness accepting
probability at least c(n) and soundness accepting probability at most s(n) for every input of length n. Consider
another proof system Π′ such that, for every input of length n, Π′ carries out k(n) attempts of Π in parallel and
accepts iff all the k(n) attempts result in acceptance in Π. Then Π′ is a three-message honest-verifier quantum
computational zero-knowledge proof system for A with completeness accepting probability at least c(n)k(n) and
soundness accepting probability at most s(n)k(n) for every input of length n.
Now Lemma 26 below follows from the essentially same argument as in the proof of Lemma 19, using Lem-
mas 24 and 25.
Lemma 26. For any polynomially bounded function p : Z+ → N, HVQZK ⊆ HVQZK(3, 1 − 2−p, 2−p).
We can also show the following lemma, which is the computational zero-knowledge version of Lemma 20.
Lemma 27. Let ε, δ : Z+ → [0, 1] be any functions that satisfy δ > 1− (1− ε)2. Then, any problem having a
three-message honest-verifier quantum computational zero-knowledge system with completeness accepting prob-
ability at least 1− ε and soundness accepting probability at most 1− δ has a three-message public-coin honest-
verifier quantum computational zero-knowledge system with completeness accepting probability at least 1− ε2 and
soundness accepting probability at most 12 +
√
1−δ
2 in which the message from the verifier consists of only one
classical bit.
Proof. We use the same protocol construction as in the proof of Lemma 20 and we only show the zero-knowledge
property. In what follows, we use the same notations as in the proof of Lemma 20.
Let SV be the simulator for the original system such that, if x is in Ayes, the states SV (x, j) and viewV,P (x, j)
are computationally indistinguishable for each 1 ≤ j ≤ 2. Let M be the Hilbert space corresponding to the quan-
tum register M. As in the proof of Lemma 20, the simulator TW for the constructed public-coin system behaves as
follows. For convenience, as in the proof of Lemma 20, let R be the single-qubit register that is used to store the
classical information representing the outcome b of a public coin flipped by W .
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Let TW (x, 1) and TW (x, 2) be quantum states in V and in (R,V,M), respectively, defined by
TW (x, 1) = trMV1SV (x, 1)V
†
1 ,
TW (x, 2) =
1
2
[|0〉〈0| ⊗ SV (x, 2) + |1〉〈1| ⊗ (V1SV (x, 1)V †1 )].
It is obvious that the ensemble {TW (x, j)} is polynomial-time preparable.
Suppose that x is in Ayes. The computational indistinguishability between TW (x, 1) and
viewW,R(x, 1) is obvious since TW (x, 1) = trMV1SV (x, 1)V †1 , view(W,R)1 = trMV1viewV,P (x, 1)V
†
1 ,
and SV (x, 1) and viewV,P (x, 1) are computational indistinguishable. The computa-
tional indistinguishability between TW (x, 2) and viewW,R(x, 2) follows from the properties
viewW,R(x, 2) =
1
2
[|0〉〈0| ⊗ viewV,P (x, 2) + |1〉〈1| ⊗ (V1viewV,P (x, 1)V †1 )], the computational indistin-
guishability between SV (x, 1) and viewV,P (x, 1), and that between SV (x, 2) and viewV,P (x, 2).
Now the lemma follows. 
Now applying the quantum rewinding technique due to Watrous [34], we show the computational zero-
knowledge version of Lemma 21, that any three-message public-coin honest-verifier quantum computational zero-
knowledge system such that the message from the verifier consists of only one classical bit is computational zero-
knowledge against any dishonest quantum verifier.
Lemma 28. Any three-message public-coin honest-verifier quantum computational zero-knowledge system such
that the message from the verifier consists of only one classical bit is computational zero-knowledge against any
polynomial-time quantum verifier.
Proof. We use the same construction of the simulator as in the proof of Lemma 21. In what follows, we use the
same notations as in the proof of Lemma 21.
Let SV be the simulator for V such that, if x is in Ayes, the states SV (x, 1) and viewV,P (x, 1) consisting of
qubits in M are computationally indistinguishable and the states SV (x, 2) and viewV,P (x, 2) consisting of qubits
in (M,N,R) are also computationally indistinguishable, and consider the simulator construction in Figure 3 in the
proof of Lemma 21.
Suppose that the input x is in Ayes.
We shall show that (i) the gap between 12 and the probability of obtaining |0〉 as the measurement result in
Step 5 must be negligible regardless of the auxiliary quantum state ρ, and (ii) the output state in Step 5 in the
construction conditioned on the measurement result being |0〉 must be computationally indistinguishable from the
state W would possess after the third message. With these two properties, the quantum rewinding technique due
to Watrous [34] works well, by using the amplification lemma for the case with negligible perturbations, which is
also due to Watrous [34]. This ensures the computational zero-knowledge property against W .
For the generating circuit Q′ of the quantum state viewV,P (x, 2) (for example, the unitary circuit P1 that
corresponds to the first transformation of the honest prover P realizes Q′), consider the “ideal” construction of the
simulator such that Q′ is applied instead of Q in Step 2 of the “real” simulator construction.
We first show the property (i).
Since the state viewV,P (x, 2) can be written of the form viewV,P (x, 2) = 12(σ0 ⊗ |0〉〈0| + σ1 ⊗ |1〉〈1|) for
some quantum states σ0 and σ1 in (M,N), the probability of obtaining |0〉 as the measurement result in Step 5 in
the “ideal” construction is exactly equal to 12 regardless of the auxiliary quantum state ρ, because trNσ0 = trNσ1
necessarily holds in this case, where N is the Hilbert space corresponding to N.
Now, from the honest-verifier computational zero-knowledge property, the states SV (x, 2) and viewV,P (x, 2)
in (M,N,R) are computationally indistinguishable. Since the circuit implementing W1 is of size polynomial with
respect to |x|, it follows that the gap between 12 and the probability of obtaining |0〉 as the measurement result in
Step 5 in the “real” construction must be negligible regardless of the auxiliary quantum state ρ, which proves the
property (i).
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Now we show the property (ii).
Let ξi = ΠiW1(|0S⊗W〉〈0S⊗W | ⊗ ρ⊗ σi ⊗ |i〉〈i|)W †1Πi be an unnormalized state in (S,W,X,M,N,R) for
each i ∈ {0, 1}, where Πi = |i〉〈i| is the projection operator over the qubits in S, and S and W are the Hilbert
spaces corresponding to S and W, respectively. Then, in the “ideal” construction, conditioned on the measurement
result being |0〉 in Step 5, the output is the state trS(ξ0 + ξ1).
Noticing that trS ξitrξi is exactly the state the verifier W would possess after the third message when the second
message from W is i and that the probability of the second message from W being i is exactly equal to trξi for
each i ∈ {0, 1}, trS(ξ0 + ξ1) = trξ0 · trS ξ0trξ0 + trξ1 · trS
ξ1
trξ1
is exactly the state W would possess after the third
message.
Towards a contradiction, suppose that the output state in Step 5 in the “real” construction conditioned on the
measurement result being |0〉 is computationally distinguishable from trS(ξ0 + ξ1), which is the state W would
possess after the third message. Let D be the corresponding distinguisher that uses the auxiliary quantum state ρ′.
We construct a distinguisher D′ for SV (x, 2) and viewV,P (x, 2) from D.
On input quantum state ξ that is either SV (x, 2) or viewV,P (x, 2), D′ uses the auxiliary quantum state ρ⊗ ρ′,
where ρ is the auxiliary quantum state the verifier W would use. D′ prepares the quantum registers S, W, M, N, R
and another quantum register Y. D′ stores ρ in the register X, ξ in the register (M,N,R), and ρ′ in Y. All the qubits
in S and W are initialized in state |0〉. Now D′ applies W1 to the qubits in (S,W,X,M), and then applies D to the
qubits in (W,X,M,N,R,Y).
It is obvious from this construction that D′ with the auxiliary quantum state ρ⊗ ρ′ forms a distinguisher for
SV (x, 2) and viewV,P (x, 2) if D with the auxiliary quantum state ρ′ forms a distinguisher for the output state
in Step 5 in the “real” simulator construction conditioned on the measurement result being |0〉 and the state
trS(ξ0 + ξ1). This contradicts the computational indistinguishability between SV (x, 2) and viewV,P (x, 2), and
thus the property (ii) follows. 
From Lemmas 26, 27, and 28, it is easy to show that honest-verifier quantum computational zero-knowledge
equals general quantum computational zero-knowledge. The proof is essentially same as the proof of Theorem 22,
and thus, the property that public-coin quantum computational zero-knowledge equals general quantum computa-
tional zero-knowledge also follows.
Theorem 29. HVQZK = QZK.
Theorem 30. Any problem in QZK has a public-coin quantum computational zero-knowledge proof system.
4.2 QZK with Perfect Completeness Equals General QZK
In the computational zero-knowledge case, we can show that quantum computational zero-knowledge with one-
sided bounded error of perfect completeness equals general quantum computational zero-knowledge.
The key idea is to show that any honest-verifier quantum computational zero-knowledge proof system with
two-sided bounded error can be modified to that with one-sided bounded error of perfect completeness. This can
be proved in a similar manner as in the proof of Theorem 2 of Ref. [20], but requires more careful analyses for
showing the zero-knowledge property.
Lemma 31. Let m : Z+ → N be a polynomially bounded function, let ε : Z+ → [0, 1] be any negligible function
such that there exists a polynomial-time uniformly generated family {Q1n} of quantum circuits such that Q1n
exactly performs the unitary transformation
Uε(n) =
( √
ε(n)
√
1− ε(n)√
1− ε(n) −√ε(n)
)
,
and let δ : Z+ → [0, 1] be any function that satisfies δ > ε. Then,
HVQZK(m, 1 − ε, 1 − δ) ⊆ HVQZK(m+ 2, 1, 1 − (δ − ε)2).
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Honest Verifier’s Protocol for Achieving Perfect Completeness
1. Prepare quantum registers V and M and a single-qubit quantum register X. Let Y be the single-qubit quantum
register consisting of the qubit in V that corresponds to the output qubit of the original verifier. Initialize all
the qubits in V, M, and X in state |0〉. Apply V1 to the qubits in (V,M), and send M to the prover.
2. For j = 2 to m2 , do the following:
Receive M from the prover. Apply Vj to the qubits in (V,M), and send M to the prover.
3. Receive B and M from the prover. Apply Vm
2
+1 to the qubits in (V,M) and perform the Toffoli transformation
over the qubits in (X,Y,B) using the qubit in X as the target. Send V, M, and B to the prover.
4. Receive B from the prover. Perform a controlled-not over the qubits in (X,B) using the qubit in X as the
control. Apply U †ε to the qubit in X. Accept if the content of X is 0, and reject otherwise.
Figure 4: Honest verifier’s protocol for achieving perfect completeness
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 2 of Ref. [20], but requires more careful analyses for showing
the zero-knowledge property.
Let A = {Ayes, Ano} be a problem in HVQZK(m, 1− ε, 1 − δ), and let V be the corresponding m-message
honest quantum verifier. Let V be the quantum register consisting of all the qubits in the private space of V , and
let M be that consisting of all the qubits in the message channel between V and the prover. For every input x, V
applies Vj for his jth transformation to the qubits in (V,M), for 1 ≤ j ≤
⌊
m
2
⌋
+ 1. We construct a protocol of an
(m+ 2)-message honest quantum verifier W . For simplicity, in what follows, it is assumed that m is even (the
cases in which m is odd can be proved in a similar manner).
For every input x, the new verifierW prepares the quantum registers V and M and another single-qubit quantum
register X. Let Y be the single-qubit quantum register consisting of the qubit in V that corresponds to the output
qubit of the original verifier V .
Using first (m− 1) messages, W attempts to simulate the first (m− 1) messages of the original m-message
protocol, by applying Vj to the qubits in (V,M) as his jth transformation, for 1 ≤ j ≤ m2 .
At the mth message, which is from the prover, W receives a single-qubit quantum register B in addition to M.
W then applies Vm
2
+1 to the qubits in (V,M), and further performs the Toffoli transformation over the qubits in
(B,Y,X), using the qubit in X as the target. Notice that the content of X is 1 if and only if the content of B is 1
and the state in (V,M) is an accepting state of the original protocol. Then W sends the registers B, V, and M to the
prover, while keeping only X in his private.
At the last message of the protocol, W receives the qubit in B and verifies if the qubits in (X,B) form the state
|φ〉 = √ε|00〉+√1− ε|11〉.
The precise description of the protocol of W is described in Figure 4.
The soundness can be proved in almost the same way as in the proof of Theorem 2 of Ref. [20]. We show the
completeness and the honest-verifier zero-knowledge properties. We first describe how the honest quantum prover
behaves in the constructed (m+ 2)-message system.
Suppose that the input x is in Ayes. Let P be the m-message honest quantum prover for the original proof
system, and suppose that (V, P ) accepts x with probability exactly pacc ≥ 1− ε. Let P be the quantum register
consisting of all the qubits in the private space of P . Let Pj be the jth transformation of P on input x in the original
protocol, for 1 ≤ j ≤ m2 .
The (m+ 2)-message honest quantum prover R for the constructed proof system prepares the register P and
another single-qubit quantum register B in his private space. All the qubits in P and B are initially in state |0〉.
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At the jth transformation of R, for 1 ≤ j ≤ m2 − 1, after receiving the register M from W , R applies Pj to the
qubits in (M,P) and sends M to W .
At the m2 th transformation of R, after receiving the register M from W , R first applies Pj to the qubits in
(M,P). R also generates the state |b〉 =
√
1− 1−εpacc |0〉+
√
1−ε
pacc
|1〉 in the register B, and sends B and M to W .
Let |ψm+1〉 be the system state in (X,V,M,B) just after the (m+ 1)-st message of the constructed protocol,
when W is communicating with R on the input x. Then |ψm+1〉 can be written as |ψm+1〉 = α0|0〉|ξ0〉+ α1|1〉|ξ1〉
for some states |ξ0〉 and |ξ1〉 in (V,M,B) orthogonal to each other, where α1 = √pacc ·
√
1−ε
pacc
=
√
1− ε and
α0 =
√
1− |α1|2 =
√
ε.
At the
(
m
2 + 1
)
-st transformation of R, after receiving the registers V, M, and B from W ,R applies the unitary
transformation Z to the qubits in (V,M,B) such that Z|ξ0〉 = |η〉|0〉 and Z|ξ1〉 = |η〉|1〉 for some state |η〉 in
(V,M) (this is possible because |ξ0〉 and |ξ1〉 are orthogonal). R then sends B to W , which is the last message of
the constructed protocol.
Now the perfect completeness is obvious from the constructions of W and R.
Finally, the zero-knowledge property against W is almost straightforward.
Let SV be the simulator for the original m-message system such that, if x is in Ayes, the states SV (x, j) and
viewV,P (x, j) are computationally indistinguishable, for each 1 ≤ j ≤ m2 .
The simulator TW for the constructed (m+ 2)-message system behaves as follows.
Let TW (x, j) be a quantum state in (X,V,M) defined by TW (x, j) = |0〉〈0| ⊗ SV (x, j)
for each 1 ≤ j ≤ m2 − 1. Let TW
(
x, m2
)
be a quantum state in (X,V,M,B) defined by
TW
(
x, m2
)
= |0〉〈0| ⊗ SV
(
x, m2
)⊗ |1〉〈1|. Finally, let TW (x, m2 + 1) be a quantum state in (X,B) defined
by TW
(
x, m2 + 1
)
= |φ〉〈φ|. It is obvious that the ensemble {TW (x, j)} is polynomial-time preparable.
Suppose that x is in Ayes. For 1 ≤ j ≤ m2 − 1, TW (x, j) is obviously computationally indistinguish-
able from viewW,R(x, j), since TW (x, j) = |0〉〈0| ⊗ SV (x, j), viewW,R(x, j) = |0〉〈0| ⊗ viewV,P (x, j),
and SV (x, j) and viewV,P (x, j) are computationally indistinguishable. The computa-
tional indistinguishability between TW
(
x, m2
)
and viewW,R
(
x, m2
)
follows from the com-
putational indistinguishability between SV
(
x, m2
)
and viewV,P
(
x, m2
)
and the fact that
‖viewW,R
(
x, m2
)− |0〉〈0| ⊗ viewV,P (x, m2 )⊗ |1〉〈1|‖tr = ‖|b〉〈b| − |1〉〈1|‖tr ≤ 2√1− 1−εpacc ≤ 2√ε is negli-
gible. Finally, TW
(
x, m2 + 1
)
and viewW,R
(
x, m2 + 1
)
are identical, and thus, are trivially computationally
indistinguishable. 
Together with Lemmas 27 and 28 and the computational zero-knowledge version of Lemma 18, this implies
the equivalence between quantum computational zero-knowledge with perfect completeness and usual quantum
computational zero-knowledge with two-sided bounded error. The proof is similar to those of Theorems 22 and 29.
Theorem 32. Any problem in QZK has a quantum computational zero-knowledge proof system of perfect com-
pleteness.
Furthermore, in the computational zero-knowledge case, it is straightforward to extend Lemma 28 to the fol-
lowing more general statement.
Lemma 33. Any three-message public-coin honest-verifier quantum computational zero-knowledge system such
that the message from the verifier consists of O(log n) bits for every input of length n is computational zero-
knowledge against any polynomial-time quantum verifier.
Using Lemma 33, we can show the following.
Theorem 34. Any problem in QZK has a three-message public-coin quantum computational zero-knowledge proof
system of perfect completeness with soundness error probability at most 1p for any polynomially bounded function
p : Z+ → N (hence with arbitrarily small constant error in soundness).
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Proof. Let p : Z+ → N be any polynomially bounded function, and let q : Z+ → N be a polynomially bounded
function satisfying 2
q
2 ≥ log p+ 2.
Then, from Lemmas 31 and 24 together with Lemma 25 for parallel repetition, we have that
HVQZK ⊆ HVQZK(3, 1, 2−q).
With Lemma 27, this further implies that any problem in HVQZK has a three-message public-coin honest-
verifier quantum computational zero-knowledge proof system of perfect completeness with soundness accepting
probability at most 12 + 2
− q
2
−1 in which the message from the verifier consists of only one classical bit.
For every input of length n, we run this proof system ⌈log p(n)⌉+ 2 times in parallel. From Lemma 25, this
results in a three-message public-coin honest-verifier computational zero-knowledge proof system of perfect com-
pleteness with soundness accepting probability at most 14p(n)
(
1 + 2−
q(n)
2
)⌈log p(n)⌉+2 ≤ 1p(n) in which the message
of the verifier consists of ⌈log p(n)⌉+ 2 classical bits, for every input of length n.
Now Lemma 33 implies that this protocol is computational zero-knowledge even against any dishonest quan-
tum verifier. Hence, any problem in QZK has a three-message public-coin quantum computational zero-knowledge
proof system of perfect completeness with soundness error probability at most 1p , since HVQZK = QZK by The-
orem 29. 
5 Statistical Zero-Knowledge Case
All the properties shown for the computational zero-knowledge case also hold for the statistical zero-knowledge
case. The proofs are essentially same as in the computational zero-knowledge case. This gives alternative proofs
for the following theorems, which were originally shown by Watrous [34] using his previous results [32].
Theorem 35 ([32, 34]). HVQSZK = QSZK.
Theorem 36 ([32, 34]). Any problem in QSZK has a public-coin quantum statistical zero-knowledge proof system.
We also have the following new properties for quantum statistical zero-knowledge.
Theorem 37. Any problem in QSZK has a quantum statistical zero-knowledge proof system of perfect complete-
ness.
Theorem 38. Any problem in QSZK has a three-message public-coin quantum statistical zero-knowledge proof
system of perfect completeness with soundness error probability at most 1p for any polynomially bounded function
p : Z+ → N (hence with arbitrarily small constant error in soundness).
6 Equivalence of Two Definitions of Quantum Perfect Zero-Knowledge
In the classical case, the most common definition of perfect zero-knowledge proofs seems to allow the simulator to
output “FAIL” with small probability, say, with probability at most 12 [8, 28]. Following this convention, we may
consider the following alternative definitions of honest-verifier and general quantum perfect zero-knowledge proof
systems.
Definition 39. Given a polynomially bounded function m : Z+ → N and functions c, s : Z+ → [0, 1], a problem
A = {Ayes, Ano} is in HVQPZK′(m, c, s) iff there exists an m-message honest quantum verifier V and an m-
message honest quantum prover P such that
(Completeness and Soundness) (V, P ) forms an m-message quantum interactive proof system with completeness
accepting probability at least c and soundness accepting probability at most s,
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(Honest-Verifier Perfect Zero-Knowledge) there exists a polynomial-time preparable ensembles
{SV (x, j)} of quantum states such that, for every x ∈ Ayes and for each 1 ≤ j ≤
⌈m(|x|)
2
⌉
,
SV (x, j) = px,j|0〉〈0| ⊗ |0Hj 〉〈0Hj |+ (1− px,j)|1〉〈1| ⊗ viewV,P (x, j) for some 0 ≤ px,j ≤ 12 , where
Hj is the Hilbert space viewV,P (x, j) is in D(Hj).
Definition 40. Given a polynomially bounded function m : Z+ → N and functions c, s : Z+ → [0, 1], a problem
A = {Ayes, Ano} is in QPZK′(m, c, s) iff there exists anm-message honest quantum verifier V and an m-message
honest quantum prover P such that
(Completeness and Soundness) (V, P ) forms an m-message quantum interactive proof system with completeness
accepting probability at least c and soundness accepting probability at most s,
(Perfect Zero-Knowledge) for any m-message quantum verifier V ′, there exists a polynomial-time uniformly gen-
erated family {Qx} of quantum circuits, where each Qx exactly implements an admissible transformation
SV ′(x), such that, for every x ∈ Ayes, SV ′(x) = px(Φ0 ⊗Ψfail) + (1− px)(Φ1 ⊗ 〈V ′, P 〉(x)) for some
0 ≤ px ≤ 12 , where 〈V ′, P 〉(x) ∈ T(A,Z) is the induced admissible transformation from V ′, P , and x
for some Hilbert spaces A and Z , Ψfail ∈ T(A,Z) is the admissible transformation that always outputs
|0Z〉〈0Z |, and Φb is the admissible transformation that takes nothing as input and outputs |b〉〈b|, for each
b ∈ {0, 1}.
In Definitions 39 and 40, the first qubit of the output of the simulator indicates whether or not the simulation
succeeds — |0〉〈0| is interpreted as failure and |1〉〈1| as success.
Definition 41. A problem A = {Ayes, Ano} is in HVQPZK′ and in QPZK′ if there exists a polynomially bounded
function m : Z+ → N such that A is in HVQPZK′ (m, 23 , 13) and in QPZK′ (m, 23 , 13), respectively.
It is not obvious at a glance that HVQPZK = HVQPZK′ and QPZK = QPZK′, i.e., that the definitions of
honest-verifier and general quantum perfect zero-knowledge proof systems using Definitions 4 and 10 is equivalent
to those using Definitions 39 and 40.
Fortunately, using Theorem 22, we can show that HVQPZK = HVQPZK′ and QPZK = QPZK′. It is
stressed that such equivalence is not known in the classical case.
Theorem 42. HVQPZK = HVQPZK′ and QPZK = QPZK′.
Proof. It is obvious that HVQPZK ⊆ HVQPZK′ and QPZK ⊆ QPZK′ ⊆ HVQPZK′. From Theorem 22, we
have HVQPZK = QPZK. Therefore, it is sufficient to show that HVQPZK′ ⊆ HVQPZK.
Let A = {Ayes, Ano} be a problem in HVQPZK′
(
m, 23 ,
1
3
)
for some polynomially bounded function
m : Z+ → N. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that m takes only even values (if m(n) is odd for some
n ∈ Z+, we modify the protocol so that the verifier sends a “dummy” message to a prover as the first message
when the input has length n such that m(n) is odd). Let V and P be the corresponding honest verifier and honest
prover, respectively. Let V be the quantum register consisting of all the qubits in the private space of V , and let
M be that consisting of all the qubits in the message channel between V and the prover. For every input x, V
applies Vj for his jth transformation to the qubits in (V,M) for 1 ≤ j ≤ m2 + 1, and performs the measurement
Π = {Πacc,Πrej} at the end of the original protocol to decide acceptance or rejection. Let V and M be the Hilbert
spaces corresponding to V and M, respectively.
Let {SV (x, j)} be the polynomial-time preparable ensembles of quantum states corresponding to the sim-
ulator for this honest-verifier quantum perfect zero-knowledge proof system such that, for every x ∈ Ayes and
for each 1 ≤ j ≤ m(|x|)2 , SV (x, j) = px,j|0〉〈0| ⊗ |0V⊗M〉〈0V⊗M|+ (1− px,j)|1〉〈1| ⊗ viewV,P (x, j) for some
0 ≤ px,j ≤ 12 . This may be viewed as SV (x, j) outputting |0〉〈0| ⊗ |0V⊗M〉〈0V⊗M| with probability px,j
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and |1〉〈1| ⊗ viewV,P (x, j) with probability 1− px,j. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that each
0 ≤ px,j ≤ 2−|x|, since we can easily amplify the success probability of the simulator by just running the orig-
inal simulator a number of times so that a new simulator outputs |0〉〈0| ⊗ |0V⊗M〉〈0V⊗M| only if all the attempts
result in |0〉〈0| ⊗ |0V⊗M〉〈0V⊗M|.
First we slightly modify the behavior of the honest verifier as follows (call this modified honest verifier V ′).
At the beginning of the protocol, V ′ prepares a single-qubit quantum register B in addition to the registers V and
M. The content of B will denote if the protocol successfully simulates the original protocol (that B contains 1
indicates the successful simulation). At the first transformation of V ′, V ′ prepares |1〉 in B and V1|0V⊗M〉 in
(V,M), and sends B and M to a prover. At every message from the prover, V ′ receives B in addition to the qubits in
M the original verifier V would receive. At the jth transformation of V ′, V ′ applies Vj to the qubits in (V,M), for
2 ≤ j ≤ m(|x|)2 + 1. That is, the jth transformation of V ′ is given by V ′j = I ⊗ Vj , for 2 ≤ j ≤ m(|x|)2 + 1. Then
V ′ sends B and M back to the prover as the (2j − 1)-st message, for 2 ≤ j ≤ m(|x|)2 . At the end of the protocol,
V ′ accepts if and only if the content of B is 1 and the content of (V,M) corresponds to an accepting state of the
original protocol.
It is obvious that the soundness accepting probability is at most 13 , since it cannot be larger than that in the
original protocol from the construction of V ′.
To show the completeness and honest-verifier perfect zero-knowledge conditions, we construct a new honest
prover P ′ as follows. Let P be the quantum register consisting of all the qubits in the private space of the original
honest prover P . The new prover P ′ prepares P as well as single-qubit quantum registers B′j and quantum registers
V′j and M′j in his private space for 1 ≤ j ≤ m(|x|)2 , where V′j and M′j consists of the same number of qubits as V
and M, respectively. All the qubits in the registers P, B′j , V′j , and M′j , for 1 ≤ j ≤ m(|x|)2 , are initialized to state |0〉.
At the jth transformation of P ′, for 1 ≤ j ≤ m(|x|)2 , after having received B and M, P ′ first measures the qubit
in B in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis to obtain the measurement outcome b.
If b = 0, P ′ does nothing and just sends B and M back to the verifier.
On the other hand, if b = 1, P ′ first generates SV (x, j) in (B′j ,V′j,M′j). If this results in
|0〉〈0| ⊗ |0V⊗M〉〈0V⊗M|, P ′ flips the content of B so that B now contains 0, and sends B and M back to the
verifier. Otherwise P ′ applies Pj , the jth transformation of the original honest prover P , to the qubits in (M,P),
and sends B and M back to the verifier (note that B always contains 1 in this case).
From the construction of P ′, it is easy to see that, if the input x is in Ayes, P ′ is accepted with probability at
least 23(1− 2−|x|)
m(|x|)
2 ≥ 59 .
Next we construct a new simulator S′V ′ as follows. S′V ′ prepares the quantum registers B, V, and M and another
three quantum registers B′, V′, and M′, where B′, V′, and M′ consists of the same number of qubits as B, V, and M,
respectively. For convenience, let S′V ′(x, 0) = |1〉〈1| ⊗ |0V⊗M〉〈0V⊗M|. We define S′V ′ inductively with respect
to j, for 1 ≤ j ≤ m(|x|)2 .
Assume that the state S′V ′(x, j − 1) has already been defined. To simulate the state after the jth transformation
of P ′, S′V ′ first generates ρj = V ′jS′V ′(x, j − 1)V ′j † in (B,V,M). If the content of B is 0, S′V ′ just outputs the state
in (B,V,M). Otherwise if the content of B is 1, S′V ′ generates the state SV (x, j) in (B′,V′,M′). If the content of
B′ is 0, S′V ′ outputs the state in (B′,V,M), otherwise if the content of B′ is 1, S′V ′ outputs the state in (B′,V′,M′).
Let Πb be the projection defined by Πb = |b〉〈b| ⊗ IV⊗M, for each b ∈ {0, 1}. Then, S′V ′(x, j) can be written
as
S′V ′(x, j) = Π0ρjΠ0 + (trΠ0SV (x, j))|0〉〈0| ⊗ trBΠ1ρjΠ1 + (trΠ1ρj)Π1SV (x, j)Π1
= Π0ρjΠ0 + px,j|0〉〈0| ⊗ trBΠ1ρjΠ1 + (trΠ1ρj)(1 − px,j)|1〉〈1| ⊗ viewV,P (x, j),
for 1 ≤ j ≤ m(|x|)2 , where B is the Hilbert space corresponding to B.
It is easy to see that the ensemble {S′V ′(x, j)} is polynomial-time preparable.
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Suppose that x is in Ayes. We show by induction that S′V ′(x, j) = viewV ′,P ′(x, j) for each 1 ≤ j ≤ m(|x|)2 . For
convenience, let viewV ′,P ′(x, 0) = S′V ′(x, 0) = |1〉〈1| ⊗ |0V⊗M〉〈0V⊗M|, and let σj = V ′j viewV ′,P ′(x, j − 1)V ′j †
for each 1 ≤ j ≤ m(|x|)2 .
In the case j = 1, it is obvious that S′V ′(x, 1) = viewV ′,P ′(x, 1), since
ρ1 = σ1 = V
′
1(|1〉〈1| ⊗ |0V⊗M〉〈0V⊗M|)V ′1† = |1〉〈1| ⊗ (V1|0V⊗M〉〈0V⊗M|V †1 ),
and thus
S′V ′(x, 1) = px,1|0〉〈0| ⊗ trBΠ1ρ1Π1 + (1− px,1)|1〉〈1| ⊗ viewV,P (x, 1)
= px,1|0〉〈0| ⊗ trBΠ1σ1Π1 + (1− px,1)|1〉〈1| ⊗ viewV,P (x, 1)
= viewV ′,P ′(x, 1).
Suppose that S′V ′(x, j) = viewV ′,P ′(x, j) holds for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k. We show the case j = k + 1. By definition,
S′V ′(x, k + 1) = Π0ρk+1Π0 + (trΠ0SV (x, k + 1))|0〉〈0| ⊗ trBΠ1ρk+1Π1 + (trΠ1ρk+1)Π1SV (x, k + 1)Π1,
and notice that
viewV ′,P ′(x, k + 1) = Π0σk+1Π0 + (trΠ0SV (x, k + 1))|0〉〈0| ⊗ trBΠ1σk+1Π1
+ (trΠ1σk+1)(trΠ1SV (x, k + 1))|1〉〈1| ⊗ viewV,P (x, k + 1).
Since ρk+1 = V ′k+1S′V ′(x, k)V ′k+1
†
and σk+1 = V ′k+1viewV ′,P ′(x, k)V ′k+1
†
, we have ρk+1 = σk+1 from the assump-
tion that S′V ′(x, k) = viewV ′,P ′(x, k). Furthermore, we have
Π1SV (x, k + 1)Π1 = (trΠ1SV (x, k + 1))|1〉〈1| ⊗ viewV,P (x, k + 1).
Therefore, that S′V ′(x, k + 1) = viewV ′,P ′(x, k + 1) follows.
Hence, the honest-verifier perfect zero-knowledge property against P ′ holds in the sense of Definition 4.
Finally, recall that the success probability can be amplified using sequential repetition, and thus, that
HVQPZK′ ⊆ HVQPZK follows. 
7 Conclusion
This paper has established a unified framework that directly proves a number of general properties of quantum
zero-knowledge proofs. Our method works well for any of quantum perfect, statistical, and computational zero-
knowledge cases. We conclude by mentioning several open problems concerning quantum zero-knowledge proofs:
• We have proved that quantum computational and statistical zero-knowledge proofs can be made perfect
complete. Can quantum perfect zero-knowledge proofs be made perfect complete?
• Although we have proved properties of quantum zero-knowledge proofs directly, natural complete problems
or characterizations are definitely helpful when proving properties of quantum zero-knowledge proofs. Are
their any natural complete problems or characterizations for QZK and QPZK?
• We have investigated the properties of QZK that hold unconditionally. On the other hand, Watrous [34]
proved that every problem in NP has a quantum computational zero-knowledge proof system under some
intractability assumptions. In the classical case, it is known that every problem in IP = PSPACE is provable
in computational zero-knowledge under some intractability assumptions [18, 4, 22, 29]. How powerful are
quantum computational zero-knowledge proofs under reasonable intractability assumptions?
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Appendix
A Quantum Interactive Proof Systems
Here we review the model of quantum interactive proof systems. Although the term “round” is commonly used
in classical interactive proofs for describing each set of verifier’s question and corresponding prover’s response,
this paper follows the custom in the preceding papers of quantum interactive proofs [33, 20, 32, 23, 27] and uses
the term “message” instead of “round”. One round consists of two messages: the message from a verifier and the
message from a prover.
A quantum interactive proof system consists of two parties: a quantum verifier V and a quantum prover P .
Associated with the quantum interactive proof system are the Hilbert spaces V , M, and P, where V corresponds
to the private space of the verifier V , M corresponds to the space used for communication between the verifier V
and the prover P , and P corresponds to the private space of the prover P .
For every input of length n, each space V , M, and P consists of qV(n), qM(n), and qP(n) qubits, respectively,
for some polynomially bounded functions qV , qM : Z+ → N and some function qP : Z+ → N. Accordingly, the
entire system consists of q(n) = qV(n) + qM(n) + qP(n) qubits. Such a system is called (qV , qM, qP)-space-
bounded, and the associated verifier and prover are called (qV , qM)-space-bounded and (qM, qP)-space-bounded,
respectively. One of the private qubits of the verifier is designated as the output qubit.
Formally, an m-message (qV , qM)-space-bounded quantum verifier V for quantum interactive proof systems
is a polynomial-time computable mapping of the form V : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗. For every n and for every input
x ∈ {0, 1}∗ of length n, V uses at most qV(n) qubits for his private space and at most qM(n) qubits for each com-
munication with a prover. The string V (x) is interpreted as a ⌈(m(n)+1)/2⌉-tuple (V (x)1, . . . , V (x)⌈(m(n)+1)/2⌉),
with each V (x)j a description of a polynomial-time uniformly generated quantum circuit acting on qV(n) + qM(n)
qubits.
Similarly, an m-message (qM, qP)-space-bounded quantum verifier P is a mapping of the form
P : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗. For every n and for every input x ∈ {0, 1}∗ of length n, P uses at most qP(n) qubits
for his private space and at most qM(n) qubits for each communication with a verifier. The string P (x) is inter-
preted as a ⌈m(n)/2⌉-tuple (P (x)1, . . . , P (x)⌈m(n)/2⌉), with each P (x)j a description of a quantum circuit acting
on qM(n) + qP(n) qubits. No restrictions are placed on the complexity of the mapping P (i.e., each P (x)j can be
an arbitrary unitary transformation).
Given an m-message (qV , qM)-space-bounded quantum verifier V , an m-message (qM, qP)-space-bounded
quantum prover P , and an input x of length n, we define a circuit (V (x), P (x)) acting over V ⊗M⊗P
of q(n) qubits as follows. If m(n) is odd, circuits P (x)1, V (x)1, . . . , P (x)(m(n)+1)/2 , V (x)(m(n)+1)/2 are
applied in sequence, each V (x)j to V ⊗M and each P (x)j to M⊗P . If m(n) is even, circuits
V (x)1, P (x)1, . . . , V (x)m(n)/2, P (x)m(n)/2, V (x)m(n)/2+1 are applied in sequence.
At any given instant, the state of the entire system is a unit vector in the space V ⊗M⊗P . At the beginning
of the protocol, the system is in the initial state such that all the qubits in V ⊗M⊗P are in state |0〉. In case V
and/or P have some auxiliary quantum states ρ and/or σ at the beginning of protocol, the qubits in the private space
of V and/or P corresponding to these auxiliary quantum states are initialized to ρ and/or σ, respectively. In such
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a case, the state of the entire system may be in a mixed state in D(V ⊗M⊗P), and the descriptions below are
interpreted in the context of mixed states with proper modifications.
For every input x of length n, the probability pacc(x, V, P ) that (V, P ) accepts x is defined to be the probability
that an observation of the output qubit in the {|0〉, |1〉} basis yields |1〉, after the circuit (V (x), P (x)) is applied to
the initial state |ψinit〉 ∈ V ⊗M⊗P . Let Πacc be the projection onto the space consisting of states whose output
qubit is in state |1〉. Then, pacc(x, V, P ) = ‖ΠaccV (x)(m(n)+1)/2P (x)(m(n)+1)/2 · · ·V (x)1P (x)1|ψinit〉‖2 if m(n)
is odd, and pacc(x, V, P ) = ‖ΠaccV (x)m(n)/2+1P (x)m(n)/2V (x)m(n)/2 · · ·P (x)1V (x)1|ψinit〉‖2 if m(n) is even.
The class of problems having an m-message quantum interactive proof system with completeness accepting
probability at least c and soundness accepting probability at most s is denoted by QIP(m, c, s). The following is
the formal definition of the class QIP(m, c, s).
Definition 43. Given a polynomially bounded function m : Z+ → N and functions c, s : Z+ → [0, 1], a problem
A = {Ayes, Ano} is in QIP(m, c, s) iff there exist polynomially bounded functions qV , qM : Z+ → N and an m-
message (qV , qM)-space-bounded quantum verifier V for quantum interactive proof systems such that, for every n
and for every input x of length n,
(Completeness) if x ∈ Ayes, there exist a function qP : Z+ → N, and an m-message (qM, qP)-space-bounded
quantum prover P such that (V, P ) accepts x with probability at least c(n),
(Soundness) if x ∈ Ano, for any function q′P : Z+ → N, and any m-message (qM, q′P)-space-bounded quantum
prover P ′, (V, P ′) accepts x with probability at most s(n).
Next, we introduce the notions of public-coin quantum verifiers and public-coin quantum interactive proof
systems. Intuitively, a quantum verifier for quantum interactive proof systems is public-coin if every message from
V consists of a sequence of outcomes of a fair classical coin-flipping.
Formally, an m-message (qV , qM)-space-bounded quantum verifier V for quantum interactive proof systems is
public-coin if V has the following properties for every n and for every input x of length n. At the jth transformation
of V for 1 ≤ j ≤ ⌊m(n)/2⌋, V first receives at most qM(n) qubits from a prover, then flips a fair classical coin at
most qM(n) times to generate a random string rj of length at most qM(n), and sends rj to the prover.
An m-message (qV , qM, qP)-space-bounded quantum interactive proof system is public-coin if the associated
m-message (qV , qM)-space-bounded quantum verifier is public-coin.
The class of problems having an m-message public-coin quantum interactive proof system with completeness
accepting probability at least c and soundness accepting probability at most s is denoted by QAM(m, c, s). The
following is the formal definition of the class QAM(m, c, s).
Definition 44. Given a polynomially bounded function m : Z+ → N and functions c, s : Z+ → [0, 1], a problem
A = {Ayes, Ano} is in QAM(m, c, s) iff there exist polynomially bounded functions qV , qM : Z+ → N iff there
exist polynomially bounded functions qV , qM : Z+ → N and an m-message (qV , qM)-space-bounded public-coin
quantum verifier V for quantum interactive proof systems such that, for every n and for every input x of length n,
(Completeness) if x ∈ Ayes, there exist a function qP : Z+ → N, and an m-message (qM, qP)-space-bounded
quantum prover P such that (V, P ) accepts x with probability at least c(n),
(Soundness) if x ∈ Ano, for any function q′P : Z+ → N, and any m-message (qM, q′P)-space-bounded quantum
prover P ′, (V, P ′) accepts x with probability at most s(n).
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B Note on the Choice of Universal Gate Set
When proving statements concerning quantum perfect zero-knowledge proofs or proofs having perfect complete-
ness, we assume that our universal gate set satisfies some conditions, since these “perfect” properties may not hold
with an arbitrary universal gate set.
For instance, in the case of the paper by Kitaev and Watrous [20], when we try to implement their parallelization
protocol to three messages by unitary quantum circuits, we need to implement the controlled-unitary operation
controlled by the message index r chosen by the verifier at his first transformation. If this implementation is not
exact, we may lose the perfect completeness property after the parallelization, which affects their final statement
that any problem in QIP has a three-message quantum interactive proof system of perfect completeness with
exponentially small error in soundness.
Furthermore, in the case of the paper by Marriott and Watrous [23], their method of converting any three-
message quantum interactive proof system to a three-message public-coin one works well only if the original
three-message protocol is implemented with unitary quantum circuits. Thus, their result inherits the problem of
how to implement with unitary circuits the parallelization protocol due to Kitaev and Watrous [20], when claiming
their statement in a final form that any problem in QIP has a three-message public-coin quantum interactive proof
system of perfect completeness with exponentially small error in soundness (i.e., QIP ⊆ QMAM(1, 2−p) for any
polynomially bounded function p).
This is also the case for the present paper, since we are using both a modified version of the parallelization
protocol due to Kitaev and Watrous [20] and a public-coin technique due to Marriott and Watrous [23]. In our
case, if the implementations of the controlled-unitary transformations are not exact, we may lose the perfect zero-
knowledge property after the parallelization, since the implementations used for the simulator may differ from
those used for the honest verifier.
One direct solution to avoid these problems is to use such a universal gate set that (i) the Hadamard and Toffoli
gates are exactly implementable with a constant number of gates in the universal gate set, and (ii) given a circuit Q
consisting of gates in the universal gate set that exactly implements a unitary transformation U , we can construct
another circuit Q′ consisting of gates in the same universal gate set that exactly implements the controlled-U
transformation such that the size of Q′ is bounded by polynomial with respect to the size of Q. For instance, if the
Toffoli gate is in our universal gate set U and the controlled-U gate is necessarily included in U for any gate U in U
not of controlled-unitary type, the condition (ii) is satisfied. This is because the controlled-controlled-U operator is
easily realized by the controlled-U and Toffoli gates. From these observations, one can see that, for example, the
set consisting of the Hadamard gate, the controlled-Hadamard gate, and the Toffoli gate satisfies both (i) and (ii).
Watrous [35] pointed out that the condition (ii) is actually not necessary for our purpose. In fact, what we
need is a unitary implementation of the parallelization protocol that does not lose the “perfect” properties. The
essence of the Kitaev-Watrous parallelization method lies in the use of the controlled-swap test. Note that, if
we may assume the condition (i), the controlled-swap transformation can be implemented exactly. Now, instead of
implementing the controlled-unitary operation controlled by the message index r, we may implement the following
that is sufficient for our purpose. For simplicity, it is assumed that r is chosen from the set {0, . . . , 2l − 1} for
some positive integer l (such an assumption does not lose generality because we can appropriately add “dummy”
messages to the underlying protocol so that the number of messages becomes 2l+1 in the underlying protocol),
and the unitary transformation Ur is applied when r is chosen. Suppose Ur acts over q qubits in a register T,
for each r. We prepare ancillae of q qubits in a register Ar for each r, and set the control qubits in a register C
to the state 1√
2l
∑2l−1
r=0 |r〉. We first swap the content of T and that of Ar when the content of C is r, for each
r (this can be realized using controlled-swap transformations). Next we apply U0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ U2l−1 to the qubits in
(A0, . . . ,A2l−1), and then we again swap the content of T and that of Ar when the content of C is r, for each r.
This results in applying U0 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Ur−1 ⊗ I2q ⊗ Ur+1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ U2l−1 to some meaningless quantum state when
the content of C is r, and thus, would not keep the coherence of the quantum state in C. However, recall that
the control part in the Kitaev-Watrous parallelization protocol is the message index r, which is originally chosen
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at random classically when we describe the protocol in a non-unitary manner. Hence such decoherence does not
affect the protocol at all, and we can have the unitary implementation of the protocol only using the circuits for
Ur’s and for the controlled-swap operation. We may also use a similar technique when constructing a simulator. To
avoid unnecessary complication, now the honest verifier sends all the ancilla qubits in the registers A0, . . . ,A2l−1 to
a prover at the second message in addition to the actual message prescribed in the protocol. The honest prover just
ignores these ancilla qubits when sending the third message, and the simulator does not need to simulate the ancilla
qubits. Therefore, all the “perfect” properties claimed in this paper (and ones in Refs. [20, 23]) hold with any gate
set such that the Hadamard transformation and any classical reversible transformations are exactly implementable.
Fortunately, most of the standard gate sets satisfy this condition. A typical example is the Shor basis [30] consisting
of the Hadamard gate, the controlled-i-phase-shift gate, and the Toffoli gate.
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